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On April 19, 2005, the Supreme Court announced its unanimous opinion in Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo,1 concerning what a plaintiff must show to establish
causation in a Rule lob-5 fraud-on-the-market suit for damages. The opinion had been
awaited with considerable anticipation, being described at the time of oral argument in
1. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005).
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the Financial Times, for example, as the "most important securities case in a decade."
2
After the opinion was handed down, a representative of the plaintiffs' bar lauded it as a
"unanimous ruling protecting investors' ability to sue." 3 A representative of the
defendants' bar equally enthusiastically hailed it as "a significant victory for public
companies and others named as defendants in securities fraud cases." 4 This Article seeks
to ascertain the opinion's real significance and to provide a framework for resolving the
issues that remain open to be decided by future courts. In the tradition of Bob Clark's
treatment of Rule lOb-5 issuer misstatement cases, this framework recognizes that these
issues involve difficult tradeoffs that defy perfect solutions.
5
The Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuticals came
against the backdrop of years of highly confusing lower court decisions concerning what
a plaintiff needs to show to establish causation in a fraud-on-the-market suit. This
confusion had arisen, I will argue, because the lower courts had tried to analyze causation
in fraud-on-the-market cases using the twin concepts of "transaction causation" and "loss
causation." These concepts had been originally developed in connection with causation
determinations in cases based on traditional reliance. Traditional reliance-based cases,
unlike fraud-on-the-market cases, involve the plaintiff establishing that defendant's
misstatement induced the plaintiff to enter into what has turned out to be a losing
transaction. In such cases, transaction causation was satisfied by the very showing of
traditional reliance, i.e., that the plaintiff would not have purchased but for the
misstatement. 6 Loss causation in these cases involved, in turn, an additional showing that
the purchased security declined in value from what was paid (or was sold at a loss) and
that the decline or loss was in some way reasonably related to the falsity of the statement
that induced the purchase. 7 The function of the loss causation requirement, like the
function of proximate cause in actions for negligence, was to prevent the wrongdoer from
being responsible for all the consequences for which his action was a "but for" cause, i.e.,
all the losses, however unrelated to the misstatement, that the plaintiff might suffer over
time as a result of purchasing this security.
Fraud-on-the-market actions such as Dura are very different from traditional
reliance-based actions. The plaintiff in a traditional reliance-based action is typically a
purchaser involved in either a face-to-face transaction in shares of a non-publicly traded
issuer or an IPO. These are the only situations where plaintiffs are likely to be able to
show traditional reliance. These are situations where there is no reason to assume that the
2. Patti Waldmeir, Supreme Court to Rule on 'Most Important Securities Case in a Decade,' FIN. TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2005, at 5.
3. Press Release, Lerach Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, Ruling on 'Loss Causation' Affirms
Investors' Rights to Damages (Apr. 19, 2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.lerachlaw.comlcsr-
cgi-bin/miltempl=news/articles/dura.html.
4. Press Release, Latham & Watkins Client Alert 455, Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals
Unanimously Endorses "Loss Causation" Requirement in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases 4 (Apr. 28, 2005),
available at http://www.lw.com/resource/Publications/_pdf/pub 1258- I.pdf.
5. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 343-45 (1986). Clark notes the tradeoff between deterring
misstatements and protecting innocent shareholders, who are the ultimate source of the compensation paid to
the injured parties. Clark describes one approach as being "perhaps ... the least unpalatable alternative." Id. at
345.
6. See, e.g., Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt. v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2003).
7. See infra Part I.
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price is an efficient one. In contrast, plaintiffs in fraud-on-the-market actions such as
Dura are purchasers in active public secondary markets, where prices can be assumed to
be efficient. Fraud-on-the-market actions involve a fundamentally different kind of causal
connection between the defendant's misstatement and the plaintiffs injury. The
defendant's misstatement injures the plaintiff not because it caused her to make a
purchase that later, ex post, turned out to be a losing transaction. Rather, it injures her
because, ex ante, it caused her to pay a purchase price that is higher than it would have
been but for the misstatement. The purchase is one that she might well have made even if
the defendant had not made the misstatement. This causal connection between the
misstatement and an injury in the form of its effect on price at the time the plaintiff enters
into the transaction was recognized by the Court when it originally approved fraud-on-
the-market actions in Basic v. Levinson8 almost twenty years ago.
The fraud-on-the-market theory's ex ante focus on the price at the time of purchase
is, for transactions occurring in efficient markets, what is called for by the modem,
efficiency-oriented economic thinking that has been the driving force behind the
evolution of securities regulation over the last two decades. Efficiency-oriented thinking
considers problems from an ex ante perspective because its concern is with the law's
effect on the structure of incentives of the various actors involved at the time the plaintiff
enters into the transaction. Thus, it is these actors' expectations at the time of the
transaction that matters. Other than the inflation in price due to the misstatement, the
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) guarantees that the purchase price is a fair one
because the other factors affecting price in the future are as likely to increase price as
decrease it.9 Thus, the injury is the inflation in price at the time of purchase.
The twin concepts of transaction causation and loss causation are reasonably
serviceable in helping to determine when causation is, and is not, present in an action for
fraud based on traditional reliance. These twin concepts simply do not make sense in an
action for fraud based on the fraud-on-the-market theory, however, because of the
difference between the two kinds of actions in terms of the causal connections between
misstatement and injury. The transaction causation requirement makes no sense in a
fraud-on-the-market action since the plaintiff is not required to show that she would not
8. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) (stating that the fraud-on-the-market theory, based
on the idea that a material misstatement will affect the plaintiff's purchase price, provides the plaintiff with an
alternative way to demonstrate "the requisite causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a
plaintiffs injury"). The rule in Basic applies both to suits by secondary market purchasers in cases of falsely
positive statements, and to suits by secondary market sellers in cases of falsely negative statements. This Article
assumes throughout a suit by a purchaser based on a falsely positive statement. Everything I have to say here
about the causation requirement in positive misstatement cases would, with the appropriate reversals, apply
equally to a suit by a seller based on a falsely negative statement.
9. Stated more precisely, the EMH holds that future returns from holding a security will be priced in an
unbiased way given all publicly available information. RICHARD A. BREALEY, STEWART C. MYERS &
FRANKLIN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 333-41 (8th ed. 2006). Combined with the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM), see id. at 188-92, the EMH provides that other factors are as likely to add as to subtract
from what would be the price predicted on the basis of the return on a completely safe asset, such as U.S.
government bonds, plus a premium reflecting the expected return on an investment in the market as a whole and
the systematic riskiness of the issuer's shares. Thus, while the EMH does not stand for the proposition that there
will be no long-term growth in share prices on average over time, it says that the ordinary investor cannot, on
average, make profits by trying to pick particular, unusually attractive stocks based on publicly available
information.
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have purchased but for the defendant's misstatement. Indeed, often she would have. The
typical plaintiff is a member of a class predominantly consisting of portfolio investors
who have made impersonal purchases of shares in the secondary market on the NYSE or
NASDAQ and may well not have been aware of the misstatement. Alternatively, the
plaintiff may have been an index fund. Even if the plaintiff had been aware of the
misstatement and was investing speculatively, the misstatement is unlikely to have been
decisive in the decision to purchase, since a believable misstatement, while making the
stock appear more attractive than it really was, would also have made it commensurately
more expensive.
The loss causation requirement makes no sense either in the context of a fraud-on-
the-market action because the injury-that the plaintiff paid too much-flows directly
from the misstatement. Requiring the defendant to compensate for such an injury presents
no danger of providing compensation for risks unrelated to the misrepresentation because
the injury is unrelated to anything that happens to price after the purchase date. Thus,
there is no need for some intervening proximate cause requirement to prevent the
defendant from compensating a loss for which its misconduct is a "but for" cause, but
which is unrelated in the sense that the misconduct did not increase the risk that the
plaintiff would suffer the loss.
Abandoning the transaction causation/loss causation framework would have
permitted the Supreme Court, I will argue, to have avoided the confusion exhibited by the
lower courts as they struggled to redefine the twin concepts to make them fit the fraud-
on-the-market context. By casting this rhetorical baggage aside, the Court could have
used the Dura case self-consciously to develop standards concerning what an ex ante
analysis suggests are the two main concerns relating to causation in fraud-on-the-market
actions. One main concern involves identifying those situations where a misstatement
actually did inflate the plaintiffs purchase price and hence create an injury. Rules are
needed concerning what the plaintiff must plead and prove, and the acceptable forms of
evidence, concerning this question. 10 The other main concern involves how to prevent
damages from being paid to the subset of investors who suffer injury by purchasing
shares at a price inflated by the misstatement but who recoup this injury in part or in
whole by reselling sufficiently quickly that the price at the time of sale is still inflated.
Thus, rules are also needed concerning who, at the pleading stage and at trial, has the
burden of proof on the question of when the market realized the true situation, thereby
dissipating the inflation in price, and what are the acceptable forms of evidence of the
occurrence of such realization.
The design of each of these sets of rules has an impact on the extent to which we
achieve two important public policy aims. One aim relates to the desirability of
enhancing share price accuracy, in particular by deterring corporate misstatements. The
other relates to the desirability of limiting the variety of transaction costs associated with
civil litigation, including, but not limited to, the costs associated with strike suits. These
two aims are in part conflicting. Good design involves minimizing these conflicts to the
extent possible and then choosing the appropriate place in the inevitable remaining
10. As will be discussed in more detail in Part IV infra, under some circumstances this concern breaks
down into two subquestions: did the misstatement inflate share price at some point in time and was it still
inflated at the time that the plaintiff purchased?
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degree of tradeoff between the two aims.
Unfortunately, the Court in its opinion in Dura did not abandon the bifurcated
transaction causation/loss causation framework for fraud-on-the-market actions and so it
was not able to address these two main concerns in a fully self-conscious way. Rather, as
the lower courts had been doing in various differing ways, the Supreme Court redefined
the twin concepts to try to make them fit fraud-on-the-market actions. The Court allowed
plaintiffs to satisfy the transaction causation requirement by use of Basic's
"presum[ption] that the price.., reflects a material misrepresentation,"I in other words
a presumption that the price is inflated by the misrepresentation. This standard is very
different than the "but for the misstatement, the plaintiff would not have purchased"
transaction causation standard used in traditional reliance-based cases. As for loss
causation, the Court ruled that a mere showing that the price has been inflated by the
misstatement is not sufficient. 12 The Court was not specific concerning what kind of
additional showing would be sufficient, a void that future courts were left to fill. The
argument of this Article is that in doing so, these future courts should be mindful that
whatever the legal rhetoric, the rules that they develop are best evaluated in terms of the
two main concerns discussed above: how well, and at what cost, they (1) identify those
situations where plaintiffs have purchased shares at a price that has genuinely been
inflated by a misrepresentation, and (2) avoid payment of damages to the subset of such
plaintiffs who recoup their injury by reselling sufficiently quickly that the price is still
equally inflated.
This Article develops the foregoing points in more detail. Part I explores the origins
of the concepts of "transaction causation" and "loss causation" in Rule 10b-5 fraud cases
based on traditional reliance. Part II explores the pre-Dura attempts of the lower courts to
apply these concepts to fraud-on-the-market theory cases and the opportunity that Dura
presented to the Supreme Court to clear up the resulting confusion. Part III discusses the
history of the Dura litigation and the holding in the Supreme Court opinion. Part IV
addresses what issues have been definitively decided by the Court in Dura and what
issues remain open to be decided in future cases. Part V considers to what extent the
reasoning used by the Court reaching its decision is useful in determining how these open
issues should be resolved. Part VI considers how, from a policy point of view, these open
issues should be resolved. Part VII concludes.
I. CAUSATION IN ACTIONS BASED ON TRADITIONAL RELIANCE
A. The Origins of the Transaction Causation/Loss Causation Framework
The twin requirements of transaction causation and loss causation were developed in
the context of Rule lob-5 fraud cases where plaintiffs were able to show traditional
reliance. The seminal case defining traditional reliance is the Second Circuit's 1965
opinion in List v. Fashion Park. 13 The district court in List found that the plaintiff, with
11. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1631 (2005).
12. Id.
13. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1965). List was a non-disclosure case where the
plaintiff claimed injury because an insider stayed silent when he allegedly had a duty to speak, not a case based
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regard to one of his allegations, would have purchased even if he had known the true
situation. 14 On the basis of this finding, the district court dismissed the claim relating to
this allegation. The Second Circuit affirmed. 15 In reaching its decision, the Second
Circuit started with a ruling that the requirement in common law misrepresentation cases
that the plaintiff show "reliance" "carried over into civil suits under Rule lOb-5."16
Citing common law authorities, the court found that "the test of 'reliance' is whether
'the misrepresentation is a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which
results in (the recipient's) loss."' 17 The court stated "[t]he reason for this requirement...
is to certify that the conduct of the defendant actually caused the plaintiff's injury." 18
Given the district court's finding that the plaintiff would have purchased anyway, which
the appeals court did not find clearly erroneous, the plaintiff clearly failed the test.
List left an open question. Suppose the plaintiff had been able to show that he would
not have purchased had he known the true situation. Would that by itself have been
sufficient to establish causation? A positive answer would mean that any person who
made a misleading statement in violation of Rule lOb-5 would be liable to anyone who
could show that the statement was a "but for" cause of the purchase of a security that
subsequently declined in price. The plaintiff would essentially be complaining to the
defendant: "You got me into this through your violation and, because I got into it, I
suffered a loss for which you should make me whole." This, however, was not the route
chosen by the federal courts in working out the contours of the implied right of action
under Rule 1Ob-5. Over time, a clear requirement developed that for liability to be
imposed, a plaintiff basing a claim on a showing that the defendant's lOb-5 violation
impelled her into making a securities purchase must show something more.
The first signs that a showing of something more was required appeared in 1969 in
another Second Circuit opinion, Globus v. Law Research Service, Inc. 19 In Globus, the
jury found defendants, who had made misleading statements in violation of Rule lob-5 in
a circular for a stock offering, were liable to plaintiffs, who had presented evidence that
they had been attracted by the misleading statements into purchasing some of the offered
shares and subsequently sustained a loss. On appeal, defendants argued that the jury
instructions on causation were improper and that there was insufficient evidence of
causation.20 The jury instructions were that "the plaintiff is required to prove ... that he
or she suffered damages as a proximate result of the alleged misleading statements and
purchase of stock in reliance to them ... [i]n other words ... that the damage was either
a direct result or a reasonably foreseeable result of the misleading statement. '21 The
court described these as "clear instructions on causation" 22 and found that they "were
on an affirmative misleading statement. The court's analysis, however, drew upon affirmative misleading
statement cases in the common law and its definition of reliance has been regularly cited as controlling in
subsequent Rule I Ob-5 affirmative misleading statement cases.
14. Id. at 464.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 462-63.
17. Id. at 462 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
18. List, 340 F.2d at 462.
19. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969).
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sufficient to bring home the basic concept that causation must be proved else defendants
could be held liable to the world."' 23 As for the evidence, the appeals court observed that
the plaintiffs not only introduced evidence that the statements were a "but for" cause of
the purchases, but that the jury could infer that the stock price was bloated as a result of
the statement. The court held that this "was sufficient ... to support a finding of [a]
causal relationship between the misrepresentation and the losses appellees incurred when
they sold."' 2 4 Thus, while the court did not explicitly say that a showing of more than just
traditional reliance was required, it did, in response to a defendant's argument that more
needed to be shown, approvingly recite jury instructions that appeared to call for a
showing of more and point to evidence suggesting the existence of more than just "but
for" causation.
Five years later, in Schliek v. Penn Dixie,25 the Second Circuit moved one step
further toward a clear requirement that a plaintiff who bases a claim on a showing that the
defendant's lOb-5 violation impelled her into making a securities purchase must show
something more. Introducing for the first time into the case law the terms "loss
causation" and "transaction causation," the court stated in dicta:
This is not a case where the 1Ob-5 claim is based solely upon material
omissions or misstatements in the proxy materials. Were it so, concededly there
would have to be a showing of both loss causation-that the misrepresentations
or omissions caused the economic harm-and transaction causation-that the
violations in question caused the appellant to engage in the transaction in
question. 26
It added, however, that the something more that needed to be shown, what it termed
"loss causation," was "rather easily [shown] by proof of some form of economic
damage." 27 Finally in 1981, the Fifth Circuit provided a clear appellate court ruling that a
showing of something more was required. In Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, the
court, in finding that the trial court's failure to submit issues of reliance and causation to
the jury required a new trial, stated:
The plaintiff must prove not only that, had he known the truth, he would not
have acted, but in addition that the untruth was in some reasonably direct, or
proximate, way responsible for his loss. The causation requirement is satisfied
in a Rule 1 Ob-5 case only if the misrepresentation touches upon the reasons for
the investment's decline in value.
28
The Huddleston court links these two requirements to the transaction causation/loss
causation language used by other courts.
29
23. Id. at 1292.
24. Globus, 418 F.2d at 1291-92.
25. Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374 (2d Cir. 1974).
26. Id. at 380. The crux of the complaint was based on a "corporate mismanagement theory" that there
was a scheme to defraud in violation of Rule I Ob-5 based on "market manipulation and a merger on preferential
terms" in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. Id. at 381.
27. Id. at 380.
28. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 549 (5th Cir. 1981).
29. The court in Huddleston said that courts sometimes consider reliance to be a component of causation
and that "the term 'transaction causation' is used to describe the requirement that the defendant's fraud must
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B. The Transaction Causation/Loss Causation Framework Fits Traditional Reliance
Based Actions Reasonably Well
The twin requirements of transaction causation and loss causation are now firmly
established. 30 In the context of an action based on traditional reliance, their meanings are
fairly settled. Transaction causation involves a showing that the plaintiff would not have
purchased but for the misstatement. 31 Loss causation in this context follows on from this
first showing. It involves the additional showing that the purchased security declined in
value from what was paid (or was sold at a loss) and that the decline or loss was in some
way reasonably related to the falsity of the statement that induced the purchase. 32 These
twin requirements fit neatly within traditional reliance based actions and in this context
have a reasonably sensible rationale. The objection to imposing liability based on a
showing of transaction causation alone is the same as it would be to imposing liability for
every injury for which an act of negligence is a "but for" cause. As every first-year law
student learns, the chain of "but for" results flowing from any act of negligence can go on
forever and ultimately encompass an infinite number of injuries. For most or all of these
injuries, it would be ridiculous to hold the actor responsible. Thus, a showing of
something more than "but for" causation is required. In tort, the "something more" is
proximate cause. In Rule 1Ob-5 misleading statement cases based on traditional reliance,
the "something more" is loss causation. In each case, the "something more" involves, at a
minimum, a showing that the wrongful act somehow raised the probability that the
plaintiff would suffer a loss of the kind that she did in fact suffer.
There is also a reasonable, though not quite as compelling, rationale for the
requirement that the loss be in the form of a sale at a lower price than the plaintiff paid
(or, if the plaintiff still holds the security at the time suit is brought, a decline in the
market price from the price paid) rather than in the form of the amount extra that the
plaintiff paid as a result of the misstatement. The rationale involves an ex post
perspective rather than the ex ante perspective that is characteristic of modem,
economics-based securities law analysis. 33 It relies on the observation that being induced
by a misstatement into making a securities purchase does not by itself inherently mean
that the purchaser will ultimately be worse off. The inducement simply puts the purchaser
in a position to enjoy all kinds of possible gains and suffer all kinds of possible losses. If
the purchaser ultimately does realize a loss and the loss is one that would have been
predictable given knowledge of the true state of affairs, then, the thinking goes, an injury
has occurred for which the person who made the misstatement in violation of Rule 1Ob-5
should be liable.
The critical first step in developing the rationale for this requirement of a loss at sale
precipitate the investment decision" and is "necessarily closely related to" reliance. Id. at 549 n.24. "Loss
causation," it continued, "refers to a direct causal link between the misstatement and the claimant's economic
loss." Id.
30. See Suez Equity Investors v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating "[i]t is
settled that causation under federal securities laws is two-pronged: . .. both transaction causation ... and loss
causation"). For a survey of the cases requiring loss causation, see MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, SECURITIES
LITIGATION: DAMAGES § 11: 1 (2004).
31. See, e.g., Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt. v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2003).
32. Id.
33. See infra Part II.B.
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or decline in price is to recognize that an action based on a showing of traditional reliance
typically grows out of a face-to-face purchase of shares of a non-publicly traded issuer or
a purchase at or about the time of an IPO. In these situations, the price that the plaintiff
pays is not one established in an efficient secondary market. As a consequence, the value
of the security is much more subjective and the relationship between the misleading
statement and the price the plaintiff paid is unclear.34 Unlike what I will contend should
be the proper approach with fraud-on-the-market actions, the focus in traditional reliance
based actions should not, the argument for the rationale goes, be on the difference created
by the misstatement between the price paid and value of the security nor on the effect of
the misstatement on the price paid. This is because how low a price, if any, it would have
taken for this particular plaintiff to have been willing to buy had she been aware of the
truth-the measure of price inflation for this particular plaintiff-is inherently
unknowable. The focus instead should be on two facts. First, whatever the value of the
security at the time of purchase relative to the price paid, this particular plaintiff would
not have purchased at the price offered if she had known the truth. Second, the risks that
the truth would have revealed have in fact realized themselves.
It may be easiest to conceptualize the requirement of a loss at sale or decline in price
as related to a modified form of recissionary damages. This form of damages is called for
because of the special situations that typically give rise to traditional reliance based
actions, where the price the plaintiff paid has not been set in an efficient secondary
trading market.3 5 Pure recissionary damages would be the difference between the price
paid and the price at which the securities were sold (or, if still held, the price at the time
suit was brought). Modified recissionary damages would start with this measure but
reduce or eliminate the damages to the extent that the loss or decline was due to factors
other than ones related to the false statement. This modified recissionary measure of
damages fits nicely with the idea that plaintiff was put by the defendant's wrongful
misstatement in the position of potentially suffering losses and that as a result there
should be compensation for any losses that in fact do occur, but not if the losses arose
from reasons unrelated to the misstatement.
It should be emphasized that this rationale for requiring an ex post loss is driven by
the face-to-face or thin market situations that are associated with most traditional reliance
34. As one district court, quoted in Basic, put it, "[i]n face-to-face transactions, the inquiry into an
investor's reliance upon information is in the subjective pricing of that information by that investor." In re LTV
Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 134, 143 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (quoted in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 (1988)).
35. See Robert B. Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule lOb-5: A Restitution Alternative to
Tort Damages, 37 VAND. L. REV. 349, 361-62 (1984) (discussing modifications to the out of pocket measure of
damages needed when there is no ready market for stock or where market price of traded stock does not reflect
its actual value at the time of the transaction); Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIEs REGULATION 4414-
45, 4421-22 (2004) (discussing problems with calculating damages in close corporation and thin market
situations and the use of recissionary damages). Some of the early Rule I Ob-5 misstatement cases even suggest
that full recissionary damages are appropriate in these sorts of situations. See Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp.
128, 146 (D. Md. 1968) (calling for equitable recission in the case where defendant close corporation sold
shares to plaintiffs who relied on the corporation's misstatements); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 104-05 (10th
Cir. 1968) (stating that plaintiff was entitled to recover the difference between price paid and value at time of
discovery of the fraud); Harris v. Am. Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 226-27 (8th Cir. 1975) (same). The modification
that damages would be reduced or eliminated to the extent that there were other causes for the loss at sale or
decline in price can be regarded as reflecting a concern that full recissionary damages could result in unjustified
compensation.
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based cases and the special measure of damages that these situations may suggest. It is
only logical that in a an action for compensatory damages, the form of loss for which we
make a causation determination should correspond to the measure of damages.
Compensatory damages, after all, are supposed to measure loss. The standard measure of
damages in Rule lOb-5 cases is "out of pocket" damages: the extra amount the plaintiff
pays because of the misstatement. 36 The form of loss that corresponds to this measure of
damages is the amount by which the misstatement inflates the price the plaintiff pays.
Thus, the particular situations in which traditional reliance based fraud actions arise are
what call for the special semi-recissionary measure of damages that, in turn, call for
looking for the causes of an ex post injury rather than the causes of an injury at the time
of purchase as should be the case with standard Rule 1 Ob-5 cases, including fraud-on-the-
market cases.
II. CAUSATION IN FRAUD-ON-THE-MARKET CASES
A. The Difference in Causal Link
Fraud-on-the-market actions are distinctly different from actions based on traditional
reliance. As discussed above, the plaintiff in a traditional reliance based action needs to
show that she would have acted differently but for the wrongful misstatement. At a
minimum, this requires that the plaintiff have been aware of the statement. The fraud-on-
the-market theory, approved by the Court in 1988 in Basic v. Levinson,37 provides the
plaintiff an alternative way to demonstrate "the requisite causal connection between a
defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiffs injury."38 This alternative is to show that
the misstatement caused the price the plaintiff paid at time of purchase to be too high, an
effect that can be presumed in the case of a material misstatement by an official of an
issuer whose shares trade in an efficient market.
The Court insisted in Basic that its ruling maintained the need for plaintiff to show
reliance, just in the form of "reliance on the integrity of [the market] price" 39 instead of
reliance on the misstatement itself. There is a big difference between these two forms of
reliance, however. Unlike traditional reliance, the plaintiff no longer needs to show she
would have acted differently-i.e., not purchased the security-if the defendant had not
made the misstatement.
B. The Transaction Causation/Loss Causation Framework Fits Fraud-on-the-Market
Actions Poorly
As a result of this difference in causal link, the twin requirements of transaction
causation and loss causation fit very poorly with fraud-on-the-market actions. In these
actions, the typical plaintiff is a member of a class predominantly consisting of portfolio
36. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 662 (1986); Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1962); LosS & SELIGMAN, supra note 35, at 4413-
14.
37. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
38. Id. at 243.
39. Id. at 247.
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investors and index funds that have made impersonal purchases of shares in the
secondary market on the NYSE or NASDAQ. As noted, the plaintiff need not allege that
she relied on the misstatement. Indeed, she may well not even have been aware of it.
Even if she were, the misstatement is unlikely to have been decisive in her decision to
purchase, since the misstatement, while making the stock appear more attractive than it
really is, would also have made it, commensurately more expensive. Thus, whether she
was aware of the statement or not, she likely would have made the purchase even if the
misstatement had not been made, just at a lower price. Consequently, the misstatement is
not likely to be a "but for" cause for the purchase. The fact that for most fraud-on-the-
market plaintiffs, the defendant's misstatement is not a "but for" cause for their purchase
renders nonsensical both elements of the transaction causation/loss causation framework
as developed in traditional reliance based cases.
1. Transaction Causation
Transaction causation, as we have seen, involves a showing that the plaintiff would
not have purchased but for the misstatement. Thus, transaction causation is just another
name for traditional reliance. If courts were seriously to impose a transaction causation
requirement in fraud-on-the-market cases, they would be acting in direct contradiction to
Basic. The whole purpose of Basic was to provide the purchaser in the secondary trading
markets, for whom demonstrating traditional reliance would be an unrealistic evidentiary
burden, an alternative way to demonstrate the causal connection between a defendant's
misrepresentation and her injury.
40
2. Loss Causation
Once it is recognized that requiring fraud-on-the-market plaintiffs to show
transaction causation is inconsistent with Basic, it becomes clear that the loss causation
requirement makes no sense either. Remember that the loss causation requirement is a
follow on to transaction causation. If, to impose liability on a defendant, all that an
investor has to show is that she was induced into purchasing shares by the defendant's
misstatement-i.e., transaction causation-the defendant would be insuring the plaintiff
against every risk that could possibly depress price below the price paid at time of
purchase, including risks totally unrelated to the misstatement. Loss causation is the
requirement of "something more," akin to proximate cause in negligence, that prevents
such wide ranging liability.
A loss causation requirement serves no comparable purpose in a fraud-on-the-
market action since imposing liability based solely on a showing of this special kind of
"reliance" does not lead to similarly wide open results. The "causal connection between a
defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury" 4 1 is simply different. The plaintiff,
rather than saying to the defendant, "you got me into this and now I've suffered a loss," is
saying, "I might have purchased anyway even without your misstatement, but your
misstatement made me pay more than I otherwise would have." The claimed loss-that
plaintiff paid too much-flows directly from the misstatement. If proved true, the
40. Id. at 245.
41. Basic, 485 U.S. at 243.
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resulting damages paid to the plaintiff compensate the plaintiff for that loss and nothing
more. No insurance for any kind of risk would be provided.
C. The Pre-Dura History of the Application of the Transaction Causation/Loss Causation
Framework to Fraud-on-the-Market Cases
While the Supreme Court had never discussed the matter prior to Dura, the lower
courts had consistently said over the preceding twenty years that plaintiffs must show
both transaction causation and loss causation in all Rule 10b-5 damage actions, whether
based on traditional reliance or on the fraud-on-the-market theory.42 Having developed
the twin requirement framework for traditional reliance based actions, they apparently
felt bound to apply it to fraud-on-the-market actions as well after this new alternative
theory of liability became accepted. This effort of the lower courts to cram fraud-on-the-
market cases into the ill fitting transaction causation/loss causation framework led to
muddy legal reasoning and consequent arbitrary results.
1. Transaction Causation
While the lower courts continue to reiterate the idea that transaction causation means
that the defendant's misstatement induced the plaintiff's purchase, 43 the success of
plaintiffs in pleading and proving transaction causation never seems to be an issue in
fraud-on-the-market cases. This is odd given that a substantial portion of the plaintiffs in
a typical fraud-on-the-market class action almost certainly would have purchased even if
the misstatement had not been made. The courts seem satisfied by the fact that the
plaintiffs have shown some sort of "reliance." 44 This effort at resolution ignores the fact
that while traditional reliance and transaction causation are just two names for the same
"but for" concept of causation, the Basic type of reliance on the integrity of the market
price that characterizes fraud-on-the-market cases is not the same as transaction
causation. 45 By glossing over this distinction, the courts make the transaction causation
requirement, which logically should not be there at all in this kind of case, trivially easy
42. See Suez Equity Investors v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 250 F.3d 87, 95 (2d Cir. 2001) ("It is settled
that causation under federal securities laws is two-pronged: . . .both transaction causation ...and loss
causation"). As discussed in supra Part I, the origins of these twin requirements go back to Globus v. Law
Research Service, Inc. in 1969 and Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp. in 1975. By 1981, there was in
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean a clear appellate court ruling that a showing of both elements was required.
For a survey of the cases requiring loss causation, see KAUFMAN, supra note 30.
43. See, e.g., Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1147 (11 th Cir. 1997); Bryant v. Apple South,
Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1382 (M.D. Ga. 1998); In re Valujet, Inc., Sec. Litig., 984 F. Supp. 1472, 1480 (N.D.
Ga. 1997).
44. See, e.g., Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 178-83 (3d Cir. 2000).
45. Some courts in fraud-on-the-market cases include as part of the required showing of loss causation a
component that sounds more like transaction causation, that is, that the plaintiff must plead and prove that if he
had known the truth, he would not have purchased. See Bryant, 25 F. Supp. 2d at 1382; In re Valujet, Inc., 984
F. Supp at 1480. Based on pleadings to this effect, the courts in these cases denied motions to dismiss the
complaints. Such a pleading really fails to address whether the plaintiff would have purchased the shares but for
the misstatement, however. Nor is it very believable in most cases arising out of purchases in an efficient
secondary market. If the plaintiffs, who were outside investors, had known the truth, so would the market. The
shares might therefore have been an equally attractive purchase since the market price would have been
commensurately lower, compensating for the less rosy, true situation.
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to meet. This tactic is innocent enough by itself. After all, as we have seen, if they
seriously tried to apply the requirement, they would essentially be reversing the Supreme
Court's decision in Basic, since the whole point of the fraud-on-the-market action is to
allow suits to be brought by plaintiffs who cannot show that the defendant's misstatement
caused their purchases. The tactic has had an unfortunate side effect, however. By
allowing courts to avoid the reality that no real transaction causation exists, it creates
much confusion as to what the standard for loss causation should be.
2. Decisions Finding that Price Inflation Constitutes Loss Causation
Recall the meaning of loss causation, as it was originally developed in the case law:
a showing by the plaintiff that the purchased security declined in value from what was
paid or was sold at a loss and that the decline or loss is in some way reasonably related to
the falsity of the statement that induced the purchase. Some courts prior to Dura
concluded that a showing that the price at the time of purchase was inflated by the
misstatement is sufficient to constitute loss causation. Typically they simply asserted this
to be the case and made no attempt to explain how their conclusion relates to the meaning
of loss causation as it was originally developed in the case law.
4 6
The approach of these courts that a showing of price inflation satisfies the
requirement of loss causation had at least two defects in terms of legal reasoning. First,
while the courts acquiesced to the idea developed in the prior case law that the plaintiff
must make a certain showing, i.e., "loss causation," they provided no reasoning as to how
the new meaning that the court assigned to the term related to the meaning developed in
the prior case law that established the requirement. Nor do they try to establish how, in
the different context of fraud-on-the-market suits, showing price inflation satisfies the
purposes for which the original loss causation requirement was developed. Second, the
approach redefines loss causation in such a way that the same evidence that these courts
found satisfied the transaction causation requirement-that the misstatement caused an
inflation in the price the plaintiff paid at the time of purchase-satisfies loss causation as
well. Thus, their new definition rendered loss causation, which is supposed to be an
additional requirement beyond transaction causation, totally redundant.
Although these courts did not do so, one could argue that allowing a showing of
price inflation to satisfy the loss causation requirement in fraud-on-the-market cases
sensibly relates to the traditional loss causation formulation because, if a false statement
inflates price at the time of purchase, the market, through one route or another, ultimately
will reflect the true situation. After that point, the price will be lower than it would have
been if the market had never realized the true situation. This argument has defects of its
own, however. First, it in essence simply redefines in ex post terms the ex ante reality
that the plaintiff paid more for the security than she would have but for the wrongful
misstatement. The ex post fact that the price is lower than it would have been if the
market had never realized the true situation hardly by itself seems like a compelling
reason for compensation. The reason for compensation, if there is one, comes from the ex
46. This is the approach of the two leading appellate opinions that hold that in a fraud-on-the-market case,
a showing of price inflation satisfies loss causation. See Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th
Cir. 1996); Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 335 F.3d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 2003). This is also the approach that
was used in the Ninth Circuit opinion in Dura, 339 F.2d at 937-38.
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ante reality that the plaintiff was forced to pay too much. Second, when the market
realizes the true situation, the price will not necessarily be lower than the price the
plaintiff paid because, between the time of purchase and the point of market realization,
other factors unrelated to the misstatements may have pushed price up by more than the
removal of the misstatements' price inflation pushed it down. Therefore, even if the
misstatement inflated the price paid, the plaintiff may not have suffered a loss ex post, as
required by the traditional loss causation formulation. Third, if all the plaintiff has to
show to satisfy the loss causation requirement is that the misstatement inflated price at
the time of purchase, she does not need to show, as the traditional loss causation
formulation requires, that she held until the point that the market realized the true
situation. If she sold earlier than that point, she may have recouped at sale the amount of
overpayment at purchase.
3. Pre-Dura Decisions Finding a Showing of Price Inflation Insufficient to Satisfy the
Loss Causation Requirement
Other courts concluded that a showing that the price at the time of purchase was
inflated by the misstatement is insufficient to constitute loss causation and appeared to
require the same showing in fraud-on-the-market cases as in traditional reliance cases.
Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc.47 and Semerenko v. Cendant48 are the two leading
recent appellate court opinions taking this position. The reasoning in each also has
serious problems.
In Robbins, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the price inflation theory by the following
route. First, it stated that transaction causation is equivalent to reliance and is "akin to
actual or 'but for' causation." 49 Second, it says that the Supreme Court, in articulating the
fraud-on-the-market theory in Basic, found that a showing of price inflation "creates a
presumption of reliance," which, the Robbins court says, is "more closely related to...
transaction causation," and "not a presumption of causation." 50 Therefore, the court
refused to use the fraud-on-the-market theory to alter the loss causation requirement and
stated that it would continue to "require proof of a causal connection between the
misrepresentation and the investment's subsequent decline in value."
5 1
As discussed above, the reasoning in the Robbins opinion ignores the fact the kind
of reliance established by the Supreme Court in Basic is not "but for" causation and
hence a showing that satisfies the fraud-on-the-market kind of reliance is not a showing
of transaction causation. 52 The reasoning ignores as well that in Basic the Supreme Court
describes a showing of price inflation as providing the plaintiff an alternative way to
demonstrate "the requisite causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation
and a plaintiff's injury," 53 thereby suggesting that the Court did regard a showing of
price inflation as creating a presumption of causation. The reasoning also ignores the fact
47. Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441 (11 th Cir. 1997).
48. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000).
49. Robbins, 116 F.3d at 1147.
50. Id. at 1148.
51. Id.
52. See supra Part III.B.I.
53. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
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that because the fraud-on-the-market reliance standard is not "but for" causation, there is
no need for a showing of something more in the form of traditional loss causation to save
defendants from insuring risks unrelated to the subject matter of the misrepresentation.
Finally, the reasoning in Robbins ignores the special situations existing in the traditional
reliance based cases, where the loss causation requirement was developed, that justified
the unusual focus on ex post rather than ex ante injury, i.e., that these cases typically
arose out of face-to-face or thin or initial market situations where the purchase price the
plaintiff paid is not determined in, or guided by, a price in an established, efficient
secondary trading market.
In Semerenko, the Third Circuit also rejected the inflation theory, stating that "an
investor must also establish that the alleged misrepresentation proximately caused the
decline in the security's value to satisfy the element of loss causation." 54 It did so on a
more policy oriented basis, however. The Semerenko court's concern was that "[wihere
the value of the security does not actually decline as a result of an alleged
misrepresentation ... the cost of the alleged misrepresentation is still incorporated into
the value of the security and may be recovered at any time simply by reselling the
security at the inflated price.' ' 55 The court was certainly right that a plaintiff who sells
before full market realization of the truth should have his damages reduced or eliminated
by the extent to which the price continues to be inflated by the misstatement. But full
elimination of this price inflation, and hence of the Third Circuit's worry, does not
require that the price at time of plaintiffs sale be below the price he paid, as is required
under the traditional loss causation formulation. Again, other unrelated factors may have
increased share price by more than the full deflation reduced it. Moreover, as more fully
discussed below, the problem of sales prior to partial or full deflation could be considered
in terms of the determination of individual damages rather than causation and thus is not
necessarily fatal to the use of the inflation theory of loss causation.
56
D. The Supreme Court's Missed Opportunity in Dura
Dura presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clear up this lower court
confusion completely. The Court had not developed the twin requirements of transaction
causation and loss causation; indeed it had never even commented on them prior to Dura.
The Supreme Court was therefore in a particularly free position to end the confusion
caused by the lower courts' misapplication of a framework of their own making and to
throw out, for fraud-on-the-market suits, these ill-fitting requirements. The Court could
have, in clear language, substituted in their place the simple requirement, consistent with
its reasoning in Basic and the fundamental logic of the fraud on the market theory, that
the plaintiff plead and prove that the defendant's misstatement inflated the price the
plaintiff paid. Because of the defendant's wrongful misstatement, plaintiff paid an extra
54. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000).
55. Id. The court made this statement to suggest that earlier Third Circuit opinions that appeared to adopt
the price inflation theory of loss causation might be wrong. What the Third Circuit rule was at this point was not
tested by this case, however, since the court found that the complaint alleged that the stock involved "was
'buoyed' by the defendants [sic] alleged misrepresentations, and that it dropped in response to disclosure of the
alleged misrepresentations," id. at 186, and so the appellate court would have vacated the district court's
granting of defendants' motion to dismiss under either approach.
56. See infra Part III.D.
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amount equal to this inflation for something with no greater fundamental value than if the
misstatement had not been made. This overpayment is the injury suffered by the plaintiff
and thus the injury upon which the causation analysis should focus (although the
plaintiffs recovery in damages would be limited to the extent that she receives at the
time of sale a benefit arising from the same wrong because of any continuing inflation).
57
Abandoning the rhetorical confusion of the transaction causation/loss causation
framework and instead straightforwardly addressing the underlying reality in the way
suggested here would have done more than just clear up confusion. It would have brought
the analysis of causation in fraud-on-the-market cases in line with the modem economic
thinking that has been the driving force behind the evolution of securities regulation over
the last two decades. This thinking has an ex ante focus and is concerned with the law's
effects on the structure of incentives of the various actors involved at the time the
plaintiff enters into the transaction. The ex ante focus calls for use of the "out of pocket"
measure of damages, i.e., the extra amount the plaintiff pays at time of purchase because
of the misstatement (assuming full market realization of the true situation prior to the
sale). As we have seen, unlike actions based on traditional reliance, there are no strong
reasons in the case of fraud-on-the market actions to depart from this measure. 58 The
"out of pocket" measure has in fact all along been the standard measure of damages in
Rule lOb-5 cases generally.
59
In this regard, it is worth noting that straightforwardly addressing the underlying
reality in the way suggested here corresponds to the well known 1982 article by Daniel
Fischel, in which he argues, using modem finance theory, that in cases involving actively
traded securities, proof of materiality, causation and measure of damages should all go to
the same issue: the amount by which the misstatement inflated share price. 60 While the
Supreme Court cited Fischel's article in Basic,61 the lower courts have largely ignored its
implications as they have fashioned a post-Basic theory of causation for fraud-on-the-
market cases. As discussed below, the Court in its Dura opinion failed to seize this
opportunity to end the confusion created by the lower courts. It retained the transaction
causation/loss causation framework and rhetorically treated the case of the plaintiff who
sells prior to the market beginning to realize the true situation as one involving an
absence of loss causation rather than an absence of damages. Despite its rhetorical
shortcomings, however, the Court's opinion leaves open ample room for the development
of rules with substantive results that make good policy sense. It is simply important that
courts keep the underlying reality in mind as a guide in future action.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN DURA
Dura involved a class action by plaintiffs who were open market purchasers of
defendant Dura Pharmaceutical shares. They alleged that they had been damaged as a
57. The reasoning for limiting recovery in this fashion corresponds to Judge Sneed's concurring opinion in
Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341-46 (9th Cir. 1976).
58. See supra Part ll.B.
59. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
60. See Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively
Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW. 1, 12-13 (1982).
61. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 n.24 (1988).
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result of Dura falsely claiming progress on an asthma medication delivery device that the
FDA ultimately found not approvable. The alleged misstatements were made in a series
of press releases issued from April 15, 1997, through January, 1998. On February 24,
1998, Dura publicly announced that it expected lower-than-forecast earnings, which it
attributed to slow sales of one of its current products, Ceclor CD. Dura's share price
dropped sharply, a fact the plaintiffs alleged. In November, 1998, Dura publicly
announced the FDA finding that the asthma medication device was not approvable. The
plaintiffs did not allege that the November announcement was followed by a price drop,
although in fact it was. 62 The class consisted of all purchasers of Dura Pharmaceutical
shares between April 15, 1997, when the firm reported strong progress selling Ceclor CD
as well as the completion of "patient dosing" (a step in the tests needed as part of the
FDA approval process for the asthma medication delivery device) and February 24, 1998,
the date of the lower-than-forecast earnings announcement.
The district court dismissed the complaint in Dura for failure to state a claim,
deciding that because the complaint did not allege any relationship between the negative
FDA finding and the February price drop, the plaintiff failed to plead "loss causation."' 63
The Ninth Circuit reversed, requiring only a "pleading that the price at the time of
purchase was overstated and sufficient indication of the cause." 64 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari on whether, contrary to the Ninth Circuit's position, a plaintiff in a
fraud-on-the-market suit such as Dura must demonstrate loss causation by pleading and
proving a causal connection between the misstatement and a subsequent decline in
price. 65 Defendants, in support of their position that such a demonstration was required,
cited opinions from other circuits. 66 They were joined in their certiorari petition by an
amicus brief from the Solicitor General and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's judgment. The Court held that a
plaintiff cannot establish causation simply by alleging, and subsequently establishing,
that the price of the security on the date of purchase was inflated because of a
misstatement made by the issuer.6 7 Since the complaint only alleged that the asthma
delivery device misrepresentations resulted in the plaintiffs paying artificially inflated
prices for Dura securities and that they suffered damages, the Court concluded that the
complaint was legally insufficient and remanded the case. 68
IV. ISSUES REMAINING OPEN
The Court's holding in Dura is extremely narrow. It settles only one issue: We now
know that a plaintiff who merely alleges, and subsequently establishes, that a positive,
62. The price in fact fell 21%, from $12 3/8 to $9 3/4. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Dura Pharms., Inc., et al. v. Michael Broudo, et al., 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005) (No. 03-
932), 2004 WL 1205204.
63. In re Dura Pharms., Inc., Secs. Litig., No. 99-CV-0151-L (NLLS), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15258 (S.D.
Cal., Nov. 2, 2001).
64. Broudo v. Dura Pharms., Inc., 339 F.3d 933, 938 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 1627 (2005).
65. 124 S. Ct. 2904 (2004).
66. See, e.g., Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000); Robbins v. Koger Props.,
Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (1 lth Cir. 1997).
67. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1629 (2005).
68. Id. at 1634-35.
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materially false misstatement in violation of Rule lOb-5 inflated the price she paid for a
security has not done enough to establish causation in a fraud-on-the-market action for
damages. The pleadings must provide, in addition, some indication of the loss and the
causal connection the plaintiff has in mind. 69 And proof at trial must provide evidence
that the inflated purchase price proximately caused an economic loss. 70 The Court,
however, does not specify what kinds of allegations and proofs would be sufficient to
meet these standards. Specifically, there are two large open questions. One concerns what
constitutes a "loss," specifically whether a plaintiff would ever be allowed to establish
that a misstatement caused a loss in a situation where the price at the time suit is brought
(or, if earlier, the time of sale) is higher than the purchase price. Stated in more general
terms, this first large open question is whether a plaintiff's loss (and hence damages) is
limited to his "actual loss," i.e., the difference between his purchase price and price at
time of sale. The second large open question concerns what, for purposes of pleading,
would, beyond the allegation that the misstatement inflated the purchase price, constitute
a sufficient "indication of the loss and the causal connection" and what, for purposes of
proof at trial, would constitute the kind of evidence sufficient to establish that there had
been an inflation in price that proximately caused an economic loss. In particular, is it
necessary for the plaintiff to plead and prove a price drop immediately following the
public announcement of the truth? Or can the pleadings or proof at trial consist of some
other kind of indication that the purchase price had been inflated by the misstatement and
that the market had later realized the true situation dissipating this inflation?
A. Sale Price Above Purchase Price
Consider the situation where the price at the time of sale (or, if earlier, the time suit
is brought) is higher than the price at the time of purchase, but not as high as it would
have been had not a misstatement-caused inflation in price dissipated in the interim. In
other words, other news in the interim that was relevant to the issuer's future but
unrelated to the subject matter of the misstatement was, on balance, sufficiently positive
that it pushed the price up more than it had been pushed down by the dissipation of the
inflation.
In one sense of the word, the plaintiff has suffered no loss. She sold, or at time of
suit would have been able to sell, the share for more than she paid for it. In such a
situation, application of the loss causation rule developed in the context of a traditional
reliance-based action would bar recovery. This rule required that the purchased security
decline in value from what was paid (or was sold at a loss) and that the decline or loss is
in some way reasonably related to the falsity of the statement that induced the
purchase. 7 1 This position also appears to be urged upon the Court by the defendants in
Dura, even though Dura was a fraud-on-the-market suit, not a traditional reliance-based
suit. 72
69. Id. at 1634.
70. Id. at 1633.
71. See, e.g., Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt. v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2003).
The loss causation rule in traditional reliance-based actions and a rationale for its ex post perspective for
assessing whether a loss has occurred is discussed in Part II supra.
72. The question that the defendants successfully sought to have the Court certify was whether a plaintiff
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In another sense of the word, however, the plaintiff has suffered a loss. Assuming
that she does not sell before full market realization of the true situation, the defendant's
misstatement has made her worse off in an amount equal to its inflation of purchase price.
But for the misstatement, she would have paid exactly that much less for the share, yet
her return over her period of ownership (however long, and from whatever mix of
dividends, distributions and sales proceeds that she receives) would have been just as
great. 73 Interestingly, the U.S. government, while arguing in its amicus briefs in Dura
that the Ninth Circuit ruling in Dura should be reversed, took the position that the
plaintiff in the situation being considered here has suffered a loss. 
74
The Supreme Court explicitly reserved decision on this matter. It did so by first
noting that when a share purchaser who claims that his purchase price has been inflated
by a misrepresentation later sells at a price below his purchase price, the lower price may
be the result of factors unrelated to the misrepresentation, rather than from the dissipation
of an inflated price. The Court then went on to observe that unrelated factors can also
push the sale price above the purchase price, stating: "[t]he same is true in respect to a
claim that a share's higher price is lower than it would otherwise have been-a claim we
do not consider here."
75
B. Sufficient Pleadings and Proofs at Trial That the Misstatement Caused a Loss
What constitute sufficient pleadings, and proofs at trial, that defendant's
misstatement inflated the purchase price in a way that resulted in a loss to the plaintiff?
To see the matters left open by the Court in this regard and the variety of considerations
relevant to the task of future courts in shaping definitive rules with regard to these open
matters, it is helpful to consider four different situations. In each, a plaintiff purchaser in
a fraud-on-the-market action claims that she was injured by a defendant issuer's
misstatement. At some point after the purchase, there is an unambiguous public
announcement by the issuer that the misstatement was false. For simplicity, assume that
suit is brought immediately after the announcement (as soon as the market has had a
in a fraud-on-the-market suit must demonstrate loss causation by pleading and proving a causal connection
between the misstatement and a subsequent decline in price. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dura Pharms., Inc.
v. Broudo, No. 03-932, 2003 WL 23146437 (Dec. 24, 2003). See also John C. Coffee, Loss Causation After
'Dura': Something for Everybody, N.Y.L.J. 5 (May 20, 2005), available at http://www.law.com/ny/.
73. This statement is somewhat of an over-simplification since it assumes that the misstatement does not
enable management to operate the firm in a different way. It is quite possible that the misstatement allows
managers more slack and so they run the firm less profitably, or permits managers to obtain more
compensation, both actions that would reduce future retums to the plaintiff. Or the misstatement could allow the
firm to obtain financing on more favorable terms, thus possibly increasing the value of the firm. Each of these
possibilities, however, raises issues of corporate and securities law that differ from the cause of action under
study here.
74. In their briefs, the government makes statements such as "the inflation attributable to the untruth ...
could also be removed through an increase in the price that is smaller than it otherwise would have been," Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7, Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, No. 03-932,
2004 WL 2069564 (Sept. 13, 2004) [hereinafter Amicus Brief for the United States], and "a decline in price
may not be a necessary condition for loss causation, however, because the inflation attributable to fraud could
be reduced or eliminated even if there were a net increase in price," Amicus Brief for the United States at 13,
Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, No. 03-932, 2004 WL 1205204 [hereinafter Cert. Pet. Amicus Brief for the
United States].
75. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1632 (2005).
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chance to reflect any reaction to the announcement of the truth). 76 Two other
assumptions will be made in this initial discussion of the four situations, which will be
dropped in subsequent discussion. One initial assumption is that the plaintiff purchases
her shares immediately after the misstatement (as soon as the market has had a chance to
reflect any reaction to the original misstatement). The other, to avoid confusion with the
other large open question discussed just above, is that in each of the four situations, the
purchase price is greater than the share price at the time the suit is brought (and, if the
plaintiff sold before the suit was brought, the price at the time of sale as well).
Ultimately, when the discussion of the remaining open issues in this Part III is
complete, the implications of four potentially critical variables and their interactions will
have been considered: was there a significant price drop after the unambiguous public
announcement of the falsity of the misstatement or not; did the plaintiff continue to hold
her shares until after this public announcement of the truth or did she sell earlier; did the
plaintiff purchase the shares immediately after the misstatement was made or later; and
was the sale price lower or higher than the purchase price. The implications of the fact
that most fraud-on-the-market actions are class actions will also be considered.
1. The First Situation: Price Drops Immediately After the Public Announcement of the
Truth While Plaintiff Still Holds Shares
In the first situation, the plaintiff still holds the shares at the time suit is brought. She
alleges, and proves at trial, that immediately after the announcement of the falsity of the
misrepresentation, the price dropped significantly.
There is little doubt that this plaintiff satisfies the Court's requirements under Dura
concerning causation. The drop in price after the announcement strongly indicates that
the misstatement, when made, inflated price. It would simultaneously indicate, consistent
with the efficient market hypothesis, that after the announcement, the market realized the
true situation, thereby dissipating the inflation in price. The misstatement caused the
plaintiff to pay more than she would have otherwise and, because she held her shares
until the inflation had dissipated, she did not recoup her injury through a sale at a
similarly inflated price. Thus she suffered a loss as a result of the misstatement. 77 Given
these considerations, the plaintiffs allegation of the price drop immediately after the
announcement of the falsity of the misstatement would certainly satisfy the Court's
requirement that the plaintiff allege "some indication of the loss and causal connection."
Proof of this price drop at trial would be a strong indication both that the
misrepresentation inflated the purchase price and that the inflation later dissipated before
the plaintiff sold, thereby proximately causing a loss.
78
76. This assumption is made for expositional convenience to avoid needing to describe separately the state
of affairs where the plaintiff sells after the public announcement but before the suit is brought from the state of
affairs where the plaintiff still holds the shares at the time suit is brought. Any differences in the results between
these two states of affairs is not important for points I am making in this discussion.
77. 1 assume throughout this Article that the impact on the underlying fundamental value of the issuer's
shares of the facts asserted by the misstatement, if these facts were true, would remain constant. See infra Part
VI.C for further discussion of this assumption.
78. Modem corporate finance teaches us that calculations of price drops or increases of this sort should,
when possible, be done on an adjusted basis using the market model to take account of the influence of other
factors that are simultaneously moving share prices in the market generally. RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S.
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What, though, about cases where, unlike this first situation, there is no share price
drop immediately following the announcement. Is there any other kind of evidence that
satisfies the Court's loss causation requirements and, if so, under what circumstances?
Some of the circuit court opinions cited by the defendants in Dura appear to suggest that
nothing else would do,79 but, as is elaborated just below in the discussion of the second
and third situations, there are respectable arguments for allowing submission of a broader
range of evidence on the matter and the Court has left this question open.
2. The Second Situation: Price Does Not Drop Immediately After the Public
Announcement of the Truth While Plaintiff Still Holds Shares
In this second situation, unlike the first, there is no significant price drop
immediately after the announcement of the falsity of the misstatement. Since we assume
that suit is brought right after the announcement and that the price after the
announcement is lower than at the time of purchase, there has been a price drop at some
point, just earlier than the announcement. Like in the first situation, the plaintiff still
holds the shares at the time suit is brought.
In this second situation, the plaintiff should again easily be able to allege and prove
that the market realized the true situation. This is because the issuer made an
unambiguous public announcement that the earlier misstatement was false. The efficient
market hypothesis tells us, therefore, that to the extent, if any, the misstatement inflated
the purchase price in the first place, the price after the public announcement was no
longer inflated by the misstatement. Thus, to the extent the misstatement caused the
plaintiff to pay more than she otherwise would have, she did not recoup her injury
through a sale at a similarly inflated price. As a consequence, if the misstatement did
inflate the purchase price, it caused the plaintiff to suffer a loss.
Did the misstatement in fact inflate the purchase price, however? The fact that there
was no negative price reaction after the unambiguous announcement is unhelpful to the
plaintiff's claim, but it does not rule out the possibility that the misstatement inflated the
BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE AcQuISITIONS 194-95 (2d ed. 1995). While the courts and
securities litigants increasingly recognize that price drops and increases should be calculated in this fashion, the
practice is far from universal. All of the inferences in the Article that I suggest can be derived from price drops
or increases are stronger when they are calculated on a market adjusted basis. Where the plaintiff submits only
an unadjusted price change as evidence supporting his claim that the misstatement inflated his purchase price, it
is appropriate for the defendant to be able to introduce market adjusted data. If the defendant's data
convincingly show that there has been no price change on a market adjusted basis, the inferences suggested here
that can be drawn from an adjusted price change would be unwarranted. Where the plaintiff does submit to a
market adjusted price change as evidence supporting his claim that the misstatement inflated his purchase price,
it is also appropriate that the defendant be allowed to introduce any evidence that some other firm-specific event
occurred simultaneously that can explain the price movement. The inferences in this Article that I suggest can
be derived from price drops or increases assume that the defendant presents no persuasive evidence of this kind.
If in fact the defendant does introduce persuasive evidence that some other firm-specific event unrelated to the
misstatement or its correction explains the price change, then again the inferences suggested here would be
unwarranted.
79. Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 185 (3d Cir. 2000); Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116
F.3d 1441, 1148 (I Ith Cir. 1997). Each of these cases calls for pleading and proving that there was a causal
connection between the misstatement and a subsequent decline in price. It is not clear whether these courts
maintain that to establish the causal connection, the decline in price needs to be subsequent to the public
announcement of the truth or only subsequent to the original misstatement.
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purchase price. This is because the misstatement might initially have inflated the share
price but the market may have realized the true situation prior to the public
announcement of the truth. Complete market realization of the true situation in this
context means that the price is no longer any higher than it would have been if the
misstatement had never been made. Prior to an unambiguous public announcement, the
operation of one or more phenomena may lead to a complete market realization of the
truth. One way is a series of earlier, smaller disclosures by the issuer or others that
gradually leads market participants whose actions set price to conclude that the
misstatement was false. Another is that the price is pushed back to the level it would have
been but for the misstatement as a result of trading by insiders or others based on non-
public information or rumors concerning the true state of affairs. Another would be a
growing quiet awareness on the part of certain highly sophisticated market participants-
arbitrageurs and sell side analysts-that previously publicly-available facts, which for a
time had gone unnoticed or seemed unimportant, were in fact inconsistent with the
misstatements. Yet another is that the higher earnings or sales in the future that one
would have predicted based on the misstatement do not materialize or the poor financial
condition of the issuer, which the misstatement masked, subsequently becomes obvious.
In Dura, the Court's requirements concerning how a plaintiff establishes that a
misstatement caused a loss are phrased in terms of what more, beyond an inflation in the
purchase price, needs to be pled and proved. The Supreme Court's decision to phrase its
requirements in these terms was presumably due to the way, in turn, that the Ninth
Circuit opinion in Dura phrased its holding. Unfortunately, phrasing its requirements in
these terms is likely to lead to new confusion. In the very common situation where the
plaintiff still holds the shares after the public announcement of the falsity of the
misstatement, the "something more" is the public announcement. As just discussed,
where the plaintiff already has clearly established that the misstatement inflated the
purchase price, the public announcement is surely enough additional evidence to establish
that the plaintiff suffered a loss. Indeed, the only coherent story that the Court tells as to
how an inflated purchase price might not lead to a loss is where the investor resells at the
still inflated price. 80 The efficient market hypothesis rules out any continuing inflation in
price once there has been an unambiguous public announcement of the falsity of the
misstatement.
There is thus an irony in the Court's phrasing of its loss causation requirements in
terms of what more needs to be established beyond the inflation in purchase price. For a
plaintiff who still holds shares at the time of the public announcement, if anything is
going to be difficult to establish, it is that the purchase price was inflated, not the
"something more." I suspect that in cases such as this second situation, where there is no
significant share price drop immediately following the public announcement, the issue of
whether the misstatement inflated the purchase price is in fact the one troubling the Court
as well. The Court is probably concerned that in many of these cases, there was in fact no
inflation in the first place and hence no possibility that misstatement caused a loss. The
misstatement, although arguably facially material, did not inflate the purchase price and
unrelated factors caused the share price drop observed prior to the public
80. See infra Part IV.B.
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announcement.
81
In some cases resembling this second situation, therefore, the misstatement did
inflate the purchase price and hence certainly did cause the plaintiff a loss, and in others
it did not inflate the purchase price and hence could not possibly have caused a loss. The
existence of both these possibilities gives rise to a question that will have to be addressed
by future courts: Where there is no significant price drop after the public announcement
of the falsity of the misstatement, what alternative kinds of evidence, if any, will the
plaintiff be allowed to introduce to establish that the misstatement inflated the purchase
price?
The strongest alternative evidence would be a showing that the misstatement itself,
when initially made, was immediately followed by a significant price increase. This kind
of evidence should be at least as acceptable as a significant price drop at the time of the
public announcement of the falsity of the misstatement because it is at least as good a
market confirmation of the importance of the misstatement. The problem, however, is
that of all the misstatements that do in fact inflate the purchase prices of issuers' shares,
probably most are made to avoid disappointing expectations rather than to increase
expectations, which means they are not followed by an immediate significant price
increase.
Thus, it is important whether other, less definitive kinds of evidence of purchase
price inflation are also acceptable. If less definitive evidence is allowed, it would need to
relate to a combination of showings. First, the plaintiff would need to establish that the
misstatement was self-evidently important in the sense that if it were considered reliable,
it would significantly affect investors' expectations concerning the issuer's future returns.
The importance of the statement in this sense is something that could be established, for
example, by testimony of analysts or industry experts. Such testimony would tend to be
more persuasive if it was empirically supported by studies showing the effect of similar
announcements on the share prices of other firms. Second, the plaintiff would need to
establish that the misstatement was in fact believed by the participants in the market
whose actions set prices. One indication of the extent to which it was believed would be
the reactions of analysts or the financial media at the time the misstatement was made.
Finally, the plaintiff would have to explain how a claim that the misstatement inflated the
purchase price could be consistent with the absence of a price decline immediately after
the later public announcement of its falsity. Such an explanation would presumably
require the testimony of financial economists or securities market professionals able to
point to grounds for believing that, by one or more of the other routes discussed above,
the market was realizing the true situation prior to the public announcement. The more
persuasive the first two showings-the self-evident importance of the misstatement and
its acceptance as true by the market-the less complete this third showing-the
explanation of how the market realized the true situation prior to the public
announcement-needs to be for the overall case to be convincing.
Nothing in the Court's holding in Dura rules out use of these other less definitive
kinds of evidence. Since market realization of the true situation by routes other than a
public announcement is not uncommon, allowing submission of these other kinds of
evidence will permit actions to succeed in the many cases where the purchase price
81. See infra Part IV.B.
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genuinely was inflated but where there was no negative price reaction immediately after
the announcement. On the other hand, because these other kinds of evidence are less
reliable than a price drop immediately after the announcement or a price increase
immediately after the misstatement, allowing them will also permit more actions to
succeed where in fact the misstatement did not inflate the purchase price.
Of all the kinds of cases where a plaintiff might claim market realization of the true
situation by other routes prior to an unambiguous public announcement of the falsity of
the misstatement, the easiest to show are the ones involving allegations that the price
dropped after the higher earnings or sales in the future that one would have predicted
based on the misstatement did not materialize or after the poor financial condition of the
issuer, which the misstatement masked, subsequently became obvious. Indeed, how to
deal with these kinds of allegations has been a central question in many of the lower court
fraud-on-the-market causation cases decided since the Supreme Court's decision in Dura.
In some of these cases, the courts refuse to accept such allegations as satisfying the
loss causation requirement under circumstances suggesting that they might, as a general
matter, always insist on an allegation of price drop after the misrepresentation itself has
been unambiguously identified and corrected. 82 If this interpretation is correct, the
implicit rule seems harsh since often the announcement of the falsity of the misstatement
is the last act in a drama where the true troubled situation had become apparent well
before.
Admittedly, the disappointment concerning earnings that leads to a price drop may
82. For example, in an unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court dismissal with
prejudice of a complaint alleging that during the first half of 2001, Kmart improperly reported as a reduction in
current expenses rebates that it hoped to receive before the end of the year. D.E. & J. Ltd. P'ship v. Conaway,
133 F. App'x 994, 996-97 (6th Cir. 2005). The complaint alleged a sharp drop in share price in later 2001 after
it reported flat sales in September and declining sales in November and December, a further 60% price drop
following Kmart's announcement of filing for bankruptcy on January 22, 2002. The complaint alleged as well
that starting on January 25, 2002, there were various announcements suggesting accounting improprieties
capped by a restatement of 2001 earnings on May 15, 2002, that included a reversal of the treatment of the
hoped for rebates. Id. at 996-97, 999-1001. There was no allegation of a drop in price after the May 15, 2002,
restatement. Id. at 1001. The court found that "D.E. & J.'s causation theory looks remarkably like Broudo's
allegations in his complaint [in Dura]." Id. at 1000. In support of this finding, the court stated "D.E. & J. never
alleged that Kmart's bankruptcy announcement disclosed any prior misrepresentations to the market" and that
"D.E. & J. has done nothing more than note that a stock price dropped after a bankruptcy announcement, never
alleging that the market's acknowledgment of prior misrepresentations caused that drop." Id. These statements
come close to saying that price drops following disclosures that reveal the true situation are not insufficient to
establish loss causation since they do not specifically identify the misstatement itself and announce its falsity.
See also In re Tellium, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19467 (D.N.J. June 30, 2005); In re Bus. Objects
S.A. Sec. Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20215 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2005).
Taking a perhaps more middle ground, the court in Porter v. Conseco, Inc., 2005 Dist. LEXIS 15466 (S.D. Ind.
July 14, 2005), granted, without prejudice, defendant's loss causation based motion to dismiss a complaint
alleging major accounting irregularities and a drop in price after the company made an announcement revealing
that the company was performing poorly but not disclosing the existence of the irregularities. The court says
"[t]his is not a case where plaintiffs can point to a sharp drop in the company's stock price following
announcement of the allegedly concealed truth. The stock had long since hit bottom before these alleged
misrepresentations ...." Id. at 12. The court noted that plaintiffs claimed in argument that the truth was
beginning to "leak out" and thus contributing to the slide in share prices. The court responded that "whether the
[Dura] Court's use of the phrase 'leak out' shows that plaintiffs' suggestion would be sufficient under Dura
Pharmaceuticals is not clear. It is clear, however, that this theory is certainly not what plaintiffs have alleged in
the operative complaint." Id. at 13.
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only be at most in part due to an earlier misstatement. Similarly, the revelation of poor
financial condition leading to a price drop may only at most have been partly hidden by
an earlier misstatement. Thus, in each case, the price drop that follows these events does
not show that the misstatement in fact inflated price in the first place with the same
clarity as would a price drop that follows an unambiguous public announcement of the
falsity of the misstatement. This problem is particularly difficult where an issuer's share
price has dropped substantially and it is obvious that at least some significant portion of
decline in the market's evaluation is due to factors unrelated to the misstatement.
On the other hand, sometimes the relationship between original misstatement and at
least a portion of the subsequent disappointment or revelation is fairly clear, for example,
where premature earnings recognition in violation of GAAP is followed within a few
quarters by an earnings disappointment of a similar magnitude. A dollar more in the
earlier period obtained through premature recognition is bound to mean a dollar less in
some subsequent period. If the market does not understand that income in the earlier
period has come from this tradeoff, falsely optimistic expectations about future earnings
are bound to develop and bound to be ultimately disappointed. In apparent recognition of
the existence of such circumstances and the resulting harshness of an absolute bar, other
courts have denied loss causation based defendant motions to dismiss or for summary
judgment where the plaintiffs have alleged that the price dropped when the higher
earnings or sales in the future that one would have predicted based on the misstatement
did not materialize or when the poor financial condition of the issuer, which the
misstatement masked, subsequently became obvious.
83
3. The Third Situation: Price Does Not Drop Immediately After Public Announcement of
the Truth and Plaintiff Has Sold Shares Earlier
In this third situation, like in the second, there is a price drop prior to the
announcement of the falsity of the misstatement but there is no significant price drop
immediately after the announcement. Unlike in the second situation, however, the
plaintiff sells before the announcement. In this third situation, to prove that the
misstatement caused a loss, the plaintiff must both show that the misstatement inflated
the purchase price and that his sale occurred after at least partial market realization of the
83. See, e.g., In re Daou Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 411 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversing a district court
grant of a defendant's loss causation based motion to dismiss a complaint alleging accounting violations
involving premature recognition of income and a stock price drop after a later announcement that disclosed
disappointing earnings but not the fact that they were the result of prematurely recognized income in earlier
periods); In re Immune Response Sec. Litig., 375 F. Supp. 2d 983 (S.D. Cal. 2005) (denying a defendant's loss
causation based motion to dismiss a complaint alleging misstatements that predicted likely FDA approval of an
anti-HIV drug and asserted certain favorable test results and alleging a price drop after publication of an
academic paper contested by the issuer that cast doubt on the test results and a further price drop after a
financial co-venturer pulled out); In re The Loewen Group, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23841 (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 18, 2005) (denying a defendant's loss causation based motion for summary judgment with regard to a
suit in which plaintiffs provided evidence that the issuer overstated income by failing, when booking zero
interest installment sales, to discount to present value the future installments and that share prices dropped after
the company's announcement of $80 million charges for "reserves and other adjustments" that did not reveal
that a portion of the charge was to account for the previously disregarded imputed interest, but in which
plaintiffs produced no evidence that the share price dropped after a later disclosure of the accounting
irregularity itself).
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true situation. To establish that the misstatement inflated price, the plaintiff would need
to make the same showings with regard to the self-evident importance of the
misstatement and its acceptance by the market as true as would the plaintiff in the second
situation. The third showing relating to how the market realized the true situation prior to
the public announcement of the misstatement's falsity takes on new importance,
however. This is because the plaintiff will not only need defensively to explain why the
lack of market reaction to the announcement of the falsity of the misstatement does not
undermine the plaintiffs other evidence showing the misstatement's importance and
acceptance as true, but also must affirmatively show that the partial or full market
realization of the true situation occurred prior to his sale of the shares.
This difference is significant. At least where share price continued to fall after the
plaintiffs sale, any weakness in the plaintiffs showing that the decline prior to his sale
was due to market realization of the true situation cannot, unlike in the second situation,
be compensated for by the strength of his showings relating to the misstatement's self-
evident importance and acceptance as true. The plaintiff needs to establish that market
realization of the true situation occurred prior to his sale to show that he did not recoup
his injury through resale at an inflated price. The lack of a significant price drop after the
announcement of the falsity of the misstatement despite a strong showing of the self-
evident importance of the misstatement and its market acceptance as true may be just as
easily explained as the result of a market realization of the true situation after the
plaintiffs sale as before. Thus, while again nothing in the Court's Dura opinion rules out
the acceptability of the kinds of evidence that the plaintiff in this third situation would
need to introduce, a presentation of the same evidence by the plaintiff in the third
situation would be less reliable as to whether the misstatement really caused the plaintiff
economic disadvantage than if the same evidence were introduced by the plaintiff in the
second situation. This lower level of reliability provides a rationale for a bright line rule
prohibiting a finding of loss causation in cases resembling this third situation but not
prohibiting such a finding in cases resembling the second situation. The existence of a
rationale does not necessarily mean, however, that such a bright line rule should be
adopted. Again, there is the familiar tradeoff involved in adopting such a rule. On the one
hand, it prevents the introduction of evidence that is less reliable, and thus it will block
actions that otherwise would have succeeded where in fact the misstatement did not cause
the plaintiff economic disadvantage. On the other hand, it will also block actions that
otherwise would have succeeded where in fact the misstatement did cause the plaintiff
economic disadvantage.
4. The Fourth Situation: Price Drops Immediately After the Public Announcement of the
Truth But the Plaintiff Sells Earlier
In this situation, like in the first, there is a price drop immediately after the public
announcement of the falsity of the misstatement. Unlike in the first situation, but like the
third, the plaintiff sells before the announcement. The plaintiff in this situation cannot
claim a loss based on the portion of inflation in his purchase price indicated by the price
drop at the time of the public announcement. This is because he sold before market
realization of this portion of the inflation. Thus, the price he received still reflected it,
thereby allowing him to recoup this portion of his injury. To prove that the misstatement
caused him any loss, the plaintiff must both show that the misstatement inflated his
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purchase price by more than was indicated by the price drop after the public
announcement and that his sale was after market realization of the facts relating to this
additional inflation.
This plaintiffs proof problems are therefore essentially identical to the plaintiff in
the third situation. He cannot use the price drop after the public announcement to
establish that his purchase price was inflated in a way that caused him a loss. He needs to
show the existence of some additional inflation that is not indicated by a post-
announcement price drop and he needs to show that market realization of the true
situation with regard to this additional inflation occurred prior to his sale. As a
consequence, future courts face the same range of possible rules concerning what
evidence to admit with regard to this fourth situation as they do with regard to the third.
Whatever set of rules they choose to deal with one situation should be applied to the other
as well.
5. Changing the Four Situations to Reflect a Later Purchase
The four situations assume that the plaintiff purchases his or her shares immediately
after the misstatement (as soon as the market has had a chance to reflect any reaction).
What if the plaintiff purchases after that point, but before the public announcement of the
truth? A later purchase may alter the analysis because, to the extent, if any, that the
market realized the truth by the time of the purchase, the inflation in the purchase price
would be commensurately dissipated, along with the potential loss.
The fact that the purchase was made later should not alter any conclusions with
regard to the first situation, where the price drops after the public announcement of the
falsity of the misstatement and the plaintiff is still holding her shares. Assuming that the
plaintiff is not claiming an inflation in purchase price greater than what is indicated by
the price drop after the public announcement, the market clearly had no realization of the
true situation until the announcement and therefore not until after the plaintiffs
purchase. 84 Her purchase price would have involved the full amount of the inflation
caused by the misstatement. Thus, the analysis made of the first situation as originally
portrayed is equally applicable here and the plaintiff should easily be able to meet the
Court's requirements in Dura concerning pleading and proving loss causation.
In the second situation, where there is no price drop after the public announcement
of the truth and the plaintiff is still holding the shares, the plaintiff needs to prove that the
misstatement inflated price by a showing that the misstatement was self-evidently
important and was accepted by the market as true. He also needs to reconcile the claim of
price inflation with the absence of a price drop after announcement through an
explanation of how the market realized the true situation prior to the public
announcement. It was observed earlier, in the discussion of the second situation as
originally portrayed, that the more persuasive the showings of the self-evident importance
of the misstatement and its acceptance as true by the market, the less complete the
explanation of how the market realized the true situation prior to the public
84. Such a plaintiff, of course, might well claim there was additional inflation that was not reflected in the
price drop after the announcement because the market partially realized the true situation prior to the
announcement. This portion of the plaintiffs claim is the same as the claim made by the plaintiff in the second
situation and should be treated accordingly by the courts.
[Spring
After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions
announcement needs to be for the overall case to be convincing. Where the plaintiff
makes her purchase later, however, this explanation of how the market realized the true
situation takes on independent importance. This is because the plaintiff, to establish that
he suffered a loss, needs to show that the market has not already fully realized the
situation when he makes his purchase. This change in the second situation, with the
plaintiff purchasing later, consequently converts it to one that in this regard resembles the
original portrayal of the third situation, where the plaintiff buys right after the
misstatement but sells before the public announcement.
85
Because of this resemblance, the analysis made in the original portrayal of the third
situation is equally applicable to this changed version of the second situation. As a
consequence, future courts face the same range of possible rules concerning what
evidence to admit with regard to this changed version of the second situation, with the
plaintiff purchasing later, as they do with regard to the third situation as originally
portrayed. Again, whatever set of rules they choose to deal with one should be applied to
the other as well.
The same can be said of changing the third and fourth situations to reflect a later
purchase by the plaintiff. Whether the plaintiff purchases immediately after the
misstatement (as the situations were originally portrayed) or later, the plaintiffs
challenges are the same. She must demonstrate the existence of price inflation without the
aid of a price drop after the announcement, and her explanation of how the market
realized the true situation takes on importance independent of that demonstration.
6. Class Actions Typically Involve a Mix of These Situations
Most fraud-on-the-market actions are class actions. The typical class is composed of
all persons who purchased an issuer's shares from the time of the misstatement to the
time of the public announcement of its falsity. Thus, it will contain plaintiffs in several of
the situations described above. These realities are something that will inevitably need to
be considered by future courts as they fashion rules to deal with these situations. These
class actions fall into two categories: ones in which the public announcement is followed
by a significant price drop and ones in which it is not.
The analysis of class actions where there is a price drop immediately following the
public announcement of the truth is very straightforward. Assuming that there is no claim
of inflation in purchase price beyond what is indicated by the price drop after the public
announcement, the market clearly had no realization of the true situation until the
announcement and therefore not until after the purchases by all of the members of the
class. 86 For any member of the class still holding the shares at the time the suit is
85. In the second situation as originally portrayed, I suggested that an alternative way for the plaintiff to
demonstrate that her purchase price had been inflated was to introduce evidence that there was a price increase
immediately after the misstatement was made. If the plaintiff could successfully show such a price increase, this
would be sufficiently convincing evidence of the misstatement inflating her purchase price that she would not
need to provide an explanation of how the market realized the true situation prior to the public announcement.
With the second situation changed to reflect the plaintiff purchasing later, however, the plaintiff would need to
provide such an explanation, to show that market realization had not occurred before her purchase.
86. Similar to the discussion of individual claims in Part III.A.5 supra, there might well be a claim that
there was additional inflation that was not reflected in the price drop after the announcement because the market
partially realized the true situation prior to the announcement. This portion of the claim is the same as the claim
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brought, whenever they were purchased, meeting the Court's requirements in Dura
concerning pleading and proving loss causation should be easy. For the rest of the
members of the class, meeting these requirements should be impossible because they sold
prior to the announcement and thus recouped all of the claimed inflation.
The analysis of class actions where the public announcement of the truth is not
followed by an immediate significant price decline raises more issues. It is important to
stress, however, that for the class as a whole, the proof problems are simpler than in
many of the individual claims considered in the situations above. This is because, for
every share purchased at least once between the time of the misstatement and the time of
the public announcement, one or more members of the class suffer losses that in the
aggregate equal the amount, if any, by which the share's price was inflated at the time of
its initial purchase. If the share is purchased only once during the class period, the single
purchaser suffers this full loss. If the initial purchaser sells it prior to the end of the class
period and the price at the time of her sale is still inflated to one extent or another, she
will recoup part or all of her injury. But the second buyer of this share, if he holds until
the suit is brought, sustains whatever portion of the loss was not sustained by the first
buyer. If there are three or more purchases of the share during the class period, the same
process is at work. Whatever portion of the loss is not sustained by the earlier purchasers
is sustained by the later ones. Fundamentally, for the class as a whole, the situation is
akin to the second situation (where the plaintiff still holds her shares at the time of suit)
changed, as discussed above, to reflect that some of the shares purchased during the class
period were purchased at a point in time later than immediately after the misstatement.
Probably, however, some members of the class would have purchased immediately
after the misstatement and others close enough to that date that if there was any inflation
caused by the misstatement, its dissipation was unlikely to have already occurred. As far
as the class as a whole is concerned, the shares initially purchased by these class
members, even if sold by them prior to the announcement, are more akin to the second
situation as initially portrayed, where the individual plaintiff purchases immediately after
the misstatement is made and still holds her shares at the time the suit is brought. With
regard to these shares, one or more members of the class will in aggregate suffer losses
equal to the full amount by which the price was initially inflated by the misstatement.
Thus, the methods of proving that the class as a whole suffered at least some losses are
the same as for the individual claimant in the originally portrayed second situation. One
method of proof is to show there was a price increase immediately following the
misstatement. If there was no such increase, the other way of showing the class as a
whole sustained at least some losses is to establish that the misstatement inflated price by
a showing that the misstatement was self-evidently important and was accepted by the
market as true and by reconciling the claim of price inflation with the absence of a price
drop after announcement through an explanation of how the market realized the true
situation prior to the public announcement. Like the second situation as originally
portrayed, to prove that the class as a whole suffered at least some damages, the
explanation of how the market realized the true situation takes on no independent
significance: the more persuasive the showings of the self-evident importance of the
in a class action where the public announcement is not followed by an immediate significant price drop and
should be treated accordingly by the courts.
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misstatement and its acceptance as true by the market, the less complete the explanation
of how the market realized the true situation prior to the public announcement needs to be
for the overall case to be convincing. As long as it is established that the misstatement
inflated price, for each of the shares initially purchased immediately, or soon after, the
misstatement was made, one or more members of the class suffered a loss that in
aggregate equals the full amount by which the misstatement initially inflated the share
price.
C. Combining the Open Questions
I have discussed the two large questions left open by the Court's opinion in Dura
separately from each other to make clear what is at stake with each. Under some
circumstances, there is a possible interaction between the two, however. Consider each of
the four situations described above as initially portrayed, except with the modification
that the purchase price is less than, not greater than, the share price at the time the suit is
brought (and, if the plaintiff sold before the suit was brought, than the price at the time of
sale as well).
1. Revisiting the First Situation
In the first situation, where the announcement of the falsity of the misstatement is
immediately followed by a significant stock price drop and the plaintiff still holds the
shares at the time suit is brought, this changed assumption that the price at the time of suit
is higher than the purchase price turns out to be unimportant. This is because the
significant price drop after the announcement is a very strong indication that the
misstatement did inflate the purchase price. The fact that the price after the
announcement is still higher than the purchase price does very little to undermine this
conclusion since the drop after the announcement strongly suggests that the increase
before the announcement was due to unrelated factors. Since the plaintiff clearly held the
shares until after market realization of the true situation, the misstatement, which inflated
her purchase price, unquestionably makes her economically worse off. The case is
essentially as strong for providing compensation to the plaintiff in this modified version
of the first situation as in the situation as originally portrayed. Unless the ultimate rule
turns out to be that under no circumstances can there be compensation without an ex post
loss, which in my view would be unfortunate, 87 the plaintiff in this modified version of
the first situation, with the price at the time of suit greater than purchase price, should still
meet the Court's pleading and proof requirements under Dura concerning causation.
2. Revisiting the Second and Third Situations
In the second and third situations, however, where there is not a significant price
drop after the falsity of the misstatement is announced, the fact that the price at time the
suit was brought (or, in the third situation, at the time of sale) was higher than the price at
time of purchase weakens the plaintiff s claim that the misstatement inflated the price. 88
In these situations, if the misstatement had in fact inflated the price, the dissipation of the
87. See infra Part IV.A.
88. The exception to this statement is where the price rose immediately after the misstatement was made.
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inflation would have needed to occur between the time of purchase and the time of the
announcement of the falsity of the misstatement (or, in the case of the third situation, the
time of sale) and this dissipation would have exerted downward pressure on price. As for
the other influences on price during this period, unrelated to the misstatement, there is
just as great a probability that they too, on a net basis, would have exerted a downward
force on price as an upward one. This means that if there was any inflation to be
dissipated, the combination of the dissipation of the inflation and the other unrelated
influences on price were more likely to be negative than positive. 89 Thus, standing alone
as a single piece of evidence, the fact that the price at the time of suit or earlier sale is
higher than at the time of purchase suggests that it is more likely than not that a
misstatement-caused inflation never existed in the first place. Moreover, the greater the
increase in price, the more likely this piece of evidence suggests that there was no
inflation from the misstatement.
The fact that the price went up does not, of course, rule out the possibility that there
was inflation in price due to the misstatement: as discussed earlier, the other unrelated
influences on price might well, on a net basis, have been positive and enough to more
than counterbalance the downward force exerted on price from dissipation of an inflation
due to the misstatement. The increase in price is simply, on a probabilistic basis, a
negative piece of evidence to be weighed against whatever positive pieces of evidence
the plaintiff might present in her efforts to show the self-evident importance of the
misstatement and its acceptance as true by the market and to explain how the market
realized the true situation prior to the public announcement of its falsity. Thus, one
approach future courts might take is simply to consider all of these positive pieces of
evidence offered by the plaintiff and, if they are persuasive enough to overcome the
negative inference flowing from the fact that the price went up, find that the plaintiff
established that the misstatement inflated price.
Alternatively, the lower courts might construct one of a number of possible
simplifying bright line rules triggered by the price at time of suit or earlier sale being
higher than the purchase price. The most extreme rule would be, for cases that otherwise
resemble the second or third situations, an absolute bar on payment of damages. There
exists a rationale for such a bright line rule even if the law develops in a way that permits
compensation despite the lack of an ex post loss in cases where there is either a
significant price drop immediately after the announcement of the truth (i.e., cases
resembling the first situation) or where there is a significant price rise immediately after
the misstatement. If a case has neither of these characteristics, the plaintiffs argument
that the misstatement inflated price will have to rest on her showing of the self-evident
importance of the misstatement and its acceptance as true by the market and her
explanation how the market realized the true situation prior to the public announcement
of its falsity. The justification for a bright line rule banning any such case would be that
the plaintiff's argument is inherently weakened by the fact that the price at the time suit is
brought is higher than the purchase price.
89. To be more precise, this statement would need to be modified to recognize that these unrelated factors
push price up or down from a path that reflects the fact that over the long run share prices on average tend to
grow. See supra note 9. For relatively short periods of time, such as one or two quarters, however, this growth
factor is likely to be small relative to the other factors at work.
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A less draconian bright line rule would be an absolute bar on payment of damages
only where the increase in price between time of purchase and time suit was brought (or
earlier sale) was substantial relative to past fluctuations in price. Another approach would
be to bar compensation unless the plaintiff can meet the burden of establishing the
existence of unrelated factors that could be expected to increase price by more than he
claims the misstatement inflated price.
Again, the usual tradeoff is involved. The more restrictive the rule in terms of what
evidence can be introduced, the more cases will be blocked where the misstatement in
fact does cause the plaintiff economic disadvantage and the more cases will be blocked
where in fact it does not.90
3. Revisiting the Fourth Situation
Again, assume the price at the time of sale is greater than the purchase price.
Consider, with this modification in assumptions, the fourth situation, where the share
price drops significantly immediately after the announcement of the truth but where the
plaintiff has sold her shares before that point. As noted in the earlier discussion of this
fourth situation, the plaintiff in this situation cannot claim a loss based on the portion of
inflation in his purchase price indicated by the price drop at the time of the public
announcement. 91 To prove the misstatement caused him any loss, the plaintiff must both
show that the misstatement inflated his purchase price by more than was indicated by the
price drop after the public announcement and that his sale was after market realization of
the facts relating to this additional inflation. The modifying fact that the price at time of
sale is greater than the purchase price has the same significance as it does in modifying
90. My colleague Professor John Coffee favors a bar of some sort to recovery where the price at the time
suit is brought (or, if earlier, at time of sale) is higher than the purchase price. Coffee, supra note 72, at 5. It is
unclear, however, whether he favors a blanket bar to all such actions. He may simply favor a bright line rule
barring recovery unless there is strong, definitive evidence that the purchase price was inflated in the first place.
In other words, he might allow recovery in the first situation, involving a price decrease after the announcement
of the truth but to a level still above the purchase price, or where there is a price rise immediately after the
original misstatement, but otherwise bar recovery where the price at time of suit (or earlier sale) is higher than
the purchase price.
Coffee's reasoning really only supports this latter, narrower bar. His stated concern is with what the
absence of an ex post loss says about the likelihood that the price was inflated in the first place, not an insistence
that an investor must suffer an ex post loss for the investor to have been made economically worse off by a
misstatement. Coffee says "[e]conomically, there is little conceptual difference between a price decline because
of the discovery of a prior misstatement and a price that does not change because positive and negative news
have offset each other." Id. at 8. He poses the following hypothetical, however. The share price increases by $5
from time of purchase to time of suit. A plaintiff claims that a misstatement inflated the price by $10 and that
the market realization of the truth has dissipated this inflation but at the same time macroeconomic news has
boosted price by $15. Thus, the $5 price increase is consistent with the plaintiffs claim that the misstatement
made him $ 10 worse off. But it is also consistent with the misstatement having caused no inflation in price and
macroeconomic news boosting price by only $5, in which case the misstatement had no effect on the plaintiff's
welfare. The hypothetical, Coffee says, illustrates the danger of "'phantom losses' that have no corroboration in
actual market movements." Id. In his example in a case resembling the first situation described above, however,
prior to the announcement of the truth, the price would rise by $15, but it would lose $10 of that $15 gain upon
announcement of the truth. In such a case, the fact that the price at time of suit is $5 higher than at time of
purchase presumably should not cause Professor Coffee concern about "phantom" losses.
91. See supra Part IV.B.4.
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the second and third situations. Thus, this plaintiffs proof problems are essentially
identical to the proof problems of the plaintiff under this changed assumption in the
second and third situations discussed just above, and the analysis set out just above is
equally applicable to this modified version of the fourth situation. If courts use some kind
of bright line rule in these modified second and third situations, they should use the same
bright line rule here.
V. THE COURT'S REASONING IN DURA
The Court describes the Ninth Circuit's holding concerning what a securities fraud
plaintiff needs to establish to prove "that the defendant's fraud caused an economic loss"
as simply "that 'the price' of the security 'on the date of purchase was inflated because of
the misrepresentation.' 92 The Court rejects this holding, stating "[i]n our view, the Ninth
Circuit is wrong" 9 3 and concluding "[n]ormally, in ... fraud-on-the-market cases ... an
inflated purchase price will not itself constitute or proximately cause the relevant
economic loss." 94 The Court gives a number of reasons for reaching this conclusion.
These reasons, when subject to scrutiny, appear to be rather confused and so they
unfortunately do not provide much helpful guidance concerning how future courts should
decide the open issues delineated above.
A. An Inflated Price Results in No Loss at Time of Purchase
The Court states that "as a matter of pure logic, at the moment the transaction takes
place, the plaintiff has suffered no loss; the inflated purchase payment is offset by
ownership of a share that at that instant possesses equivalent value. '95 The Court is thus
apparently equating the value of a share at any moment in time to its market price at that
time even when that price has been distorted by a misstatement. This rather slippery use
of the term "value" is apparently based on the idea that the plaintiff could at the moment
of a security's purchase turn around and resell it at the same price as he bought it. Using
"value" in this way is contrary to one of the fundamental building block concepts in
modern corporate finance, where the "value" of a share means the expected dividends
and other distributions, discounted to present value, that the holder or holders of the
share, whoever that may be over time, will receive during the life of the issuing firm. 96 It
also ignores that the primary purpose of the securities laws, including its anti-fraud
provisions, is to promote economic efficiency and fairness by trying to minimize the gap
between price and value as it is understood in this corporate finance sense. The market,
with its capacity to digest information possessed by many different participants relevant
to predicting what the issuer's future dividends and other distributions will be, is a very
powerful appraiser of value, but not when price is distorted by a material misstatement.
More accurate share prices, i.e., prices that are closer to their fundamental values,
enhance the efficient functioning of our economy by being better signals of where scarce
92. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1629 (2005) (emphasis in the original, citation
omitted).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1631.
95. Id. (emphasis omitted).
96. BREALEY, MYERS & ALLEN, supra note 9, at 61-65.
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capital should flow and aiding in the mechanisms that provide appropriate discipline and
incentives to management. Fairness is also related to minimizing the differences between
price and fundamental value. The Court's equating of value with price obscures the fact
that while the plaintiff might be able instantly to turn around and sell for the same
inflated price that he paid, eventually the truth will come out and eliminate the inflation.
Thus, someone will be left holding the bag, having paid the premium but not able to
resell at the premium.
The Court's use of the term value is odd for a second reason as well. Fraud-on-the-
market suits are also available to sellers who sell at a price that has been depressed due to
a negative misstatement. It seems unlikely that the Court would say the depressed price
that the plaintiff received in such a case equaled the value of the share she gave up
because she could have instantly turned around and repurchased the share for the same
deflated price. Presumably the Court would recognize that the plaintiff suffered a loss at
the time of sale unless she in fact repurchased her shares at that same deflated price
before the market realized the true situation. This hypothetical concerning a plaintiff
seller and a negative misstatement is completely symmetrical to one involving a plaintiff
purchaser and a positive misstatement, and there is no apparent rationale for treating them
differently.
The Court's suggestion that a share's value equals its price is also at odds with
established securities law when it comes to the calculation of damages. The standard
measure of damages in Rule 1Ob-5 actions, including the Court's own jurisprudence on
the matter, is the "out of pocket" measure, i.e., the extra amount the plaintiff pays at the
time of purchase because of the misstatement (assuming no resale at a price that is still
inflated by the misstatement to one extent or another). 97 This measure of damages could
hardly be appropriate if value equals price at the time of purchase.
B. No Inevitable Link Between an Inflated Share Price and Later Economic Loss
Having dismissed the idea that a loss could occur at the time of purchase, the Court
argues that there also might not be a loss later either, saying, "the logical link between the
inflated share price and any later economic loss is not invariably strong." 98 In support of
this second argument, the Court starts with the observation, "if, say, the purchaser sells
the shares quickly before the relevant truth begins to leak out, the misrepresentation will
not have led to any loss." 99 It is certainly true, as already discussed, that it would be a
mistake to grant damages to such a purchaser. The reason for not granting damages,
however, is not that the purchaser did not incur an injury at the time of purchase as a
result of defendant's wrongful misstatement; he did suffer an injury by having to pay
more than he otherwise would have but for the misstatement. The reason for not granting
damages is that the purchaser has received a benefit arising from the same wrong in an
amount equal to the injury he suffered earlier. Indeed, a bar on the payment of damages
to the extent that the plaintiff recoups his injury by sale at a still inflated price is exactly
97. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 662 (1986); Estate Counseling Serv., Inc. v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d 527, 532 (10th Cir. 1962); 10 Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIEs REGULATION 4412-13 (3d ed. rev. 2004).
98. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1631.
99. Id.
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the Ninth Circuit rule on damages, one set out by Judge Sneed in his concurring opinion
in Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., °0 which is a standard textbook case on the
matter. Thus, any implication in the Court's opinion that the Ninth Circuit's holding in
Dura would have led to such a purchaser receiving damages is unfounded.
The Court then goes on to deal with the situation where the purchaser does not sell
until after truth has come out:
If the purchaser sells later after the truth makes its way into the market place,
an initially inflated purchase price might mean a later loss. But that is far from
inevitably so. When the purchaser subsequently resells such shares, even at a
lower price, that lower price may reflect. .. other events. 101
Here the Court is simply wrong. If the truth makes its way into the market, the
initially inflated price will inevitably result in a loss. Whether it is the original purchaser
of the share or some later one, some investor will be unambiguously economically
disadvantaged because the misstatement inflated his purchase price. The investor who
purchased the stock when its price was inflated and who is still holding it when the truth
comes out will have paid more for the share than he would have but for the misstatement
and will not be able to recoup this injury by selling at a similarly inflated price. This is
because the efficient market hypothesis, the foundation on which the fraud-on-the-market
theory is built, assures us that once the truth comes out, the price will no longer be
inflated.
The rationale that the Court provides for its incorrect conclusion involves some odd
form of backward reasoning. The issue the Court was purporting to address was not
whether every misstatement that at some point later is followed by a price drop inevitably
means that the misstatement has caused a loss. That is obviously not true: the
misstatement might not have inflated price in the first place and the drop would therefore
have to be the consequence of some unrelated factor, not the dissipation of inflation. The
issue the Court was purporting to address was whether there is inevitably a loss where
price was inflated by a misstatement and the truth later came out. The fact that not every
price drop is evidence that price has been inflated by a misstatement is irrelevant because
the proposition the Court was exploring assumed the price was inflated. While the
statement clearly fails logically to support the Court's conclusion that price inflation due
to a misstatement followed by the truth coming out does not inevitably lead to a loss, it
probably does reflect the Court's appropriate concern with the reliability of evidence used
to establish that a price was inflated in the first place.
C. The Ninth Circuit Holding Lacks Precedent
The Court also criticized the Ninth Circuit holding as "lack[ing] support in
precedent." 10 2 When past cases are examined carefully, however, there is not much
precedent relevant to what needs to be shown to establish causation in a fraud-on-the-
market case. This lack of precedent going either way is hardly surprising given how new
the cause of action is. The precedent that does exist is, in fact, fairly evenly split.
100. Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341-46 (9th Cir. 1976).
101. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1631-32.
102. Id. at 1632.
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The Court starts by referring to what needs to be shown to establish causation in
common law deceit actions. 10 3 The cases and commentary that it refers to, however,
relate to traditional reliance-based actions, since the fraud-on-the-market theory is not a
common law doctrine. As discussed in Parts I and II, the causal link between the
defendant's wrongful act and the plaintiffs injury is entirely different in a traditional
reliance-based action than in a fraud-on-the-market action. Therefore, the common law
cases on causation provide very little meaningful guidance to the question before the
Court. The Court's review of circuit court federal securities law Rule lOb-5 opinions
suffers to some extent from a similar problem. Two of the four cases cited, Emergent
Capital Investment Management, LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc. 104 and Bastian v. Petren
Resources Corp.,10 5 are traditional reliance-based actions, not fraud-on-the-market
actions.
When it comes to actual fraud-on-the-market cases, the Court cites only one case,
Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc.,106 that holds that a showing that the price at the time
of purchase was inflated by the misstatement is insufficient to constitute loss
causation. 10 7 And while the Court refers to the "uniqueness" of the Ninth Circuit's
perspective on this question, 10 8 it fails to note that the Eighth Circuit had adopted the
same rule as the Ninth. 109
VI. RESOLVING THE OPEN ISSUES
This Article has identified two large questions left open by the Court's decision in
Dura. The first is whether a plaintiff would ever be allowed to establish that a
misstatement caused a loss in a situation where the price at the time suit is brought (or, if
earlier, the time of sale) is higher than the purchase price. The second concerns what, for
purposes of pleading, would, beyond the allegation that the misstatement inflated the
purchase price, constitute a sufficient "indication of the loss and the causal connection"
103. Id.
104. Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189 (2d Cir. 2003).
105. Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1990).
106. Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441 (lth Cir. 1997). Robbins, which is not a very
persuasively argued case, is discussed in more detail in Part II.C.3 supra. The Court, in addition, cites
Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2000), which is also a fraud-on-the-market case. See Dura,
125 S. Ct. at 1632. In Semerenko the Third Circuit in dicta appears also to reject the inflation theory of loss
causation, stating "that an investor must also establish that the alleged misrepresentations proximately caused
the decline in the security's value to satisfy the element of loss causation." Semerenko, 223 F.3d at 185. The
Semnerenko court's concern is that "[w]here the value of the security does not actually decline as a result of an
alleged misrepresentation ... the cost of the alleged misrepresentation is still incorporated into the value of the
security and may be recovered at any time simply by reselling the security at the inflated price." Id. at 185. The
court made this statement to suggest that earlier Third Circuit opinions that appeared to adopt the price inflation
theory of loss causation might be wrong. What the Third Circuit rule is at this point was not tested by this case,
however, since the court found that the complaint alleged that the stock involved "was 'buoyed' by the
defendants [sic] alleged misrepresentations, and that it dropped in response to disclosure of the alleged
misrepresentations .... " Id. at 186. So the appellate court would have vacated the district court's grant of
defendants' motion to dismiss under either approach.
107. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1632.
108. Id.
109. Knapp v. Ernst & Whinney, 90 F.3d 1431, 1438 (9th Cir. 1996); Gebhardt v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,
335 F.3d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 2003).
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and what, for purposes of proof at trial, would constitute the kind of evidence sufficient
to establish that there had been an inflation in price that proximately caused an economic
loss. I will address each of these issues specifically and then consider some larger
questions relevant to their resolution.
A. Price at Time of Suit Higher than Purchase Price: Limiting Recovery to Actual Losses
There should not be a blanket rule barring damages in fraud-on-the-market suits
where the price at the time suit is brought (or, if earlier, the time of sale) is higher than
the purchase price or, more generally, limiting recoveries to actual ex post losses. Such a
rule would be a relic carried over without reason from traditional reliance-based actions,
where, unlike fraud-on-the-market actions, there is some rationale for a focus on ex post
losses. 110
1. Case Where Misstatement Clearly Inflated Plaintiffs Purchase Price
In a case where the price at the time of suit is higher than the purchase price, but
where it is clear that the misstatement inflated the plaintiff's purchase price and that she
has not recouped her injury through a sale prior to complete market realization of the true
situation, the defendant's misstatement has unquestionably made her worse off in an
amount equal to its inflation of purchase price. But for the misstatement, she would have
paid exactly that much less for the share, and received in return the same share with the
same value. A rule prohibiting compensation in such a case would result in a lack of
balance in outcomes depending on whether, after the purchase, other news affecting the
fortunes of the issuer, unrelated to the misstatement, is positive or negative. Investors
110. See supra Part I.B.
111. A requirement of limiting recovery to actual losses, as an application of the traditional loss causation
requirement to fraud-on-the-market case would do, poses problems even when the sale price is less than the
purchase price, if the difference is not as much as the amount by which the misstatement inflated price. The
following examples illustrate the point. In the first example, XYZ corporation violates Rule I Ob-5 by falsely
announcing on June 1 a large increase in the sales of its food division. This inflates XYZ's share price by $10,
resulting in its shares trading at $60 instead of $50. Later the same day, A buys a share in the secondary market
at the $60 price. Two things happen thereafter during the month of June: the Bolivian government confiscates
XYZ's mineral properties in Bolivia (part of a business unrelated to food) and the market realizes the truth
about the food division's sales. As a result, by July 1, the price has gone down from $60 to $30 (i.e., the
confiscation subtracts $20 from the price and the realization of the truth about the food sales subtracts another
$10, for a total decline of $30). On July 1, suit is brought. A has not sold. Under the approach advocated here,
A's loss due to the misstatement is $10 because the misstatement caused him to pay $10 more than he otherwise
would have. He would receive no compensation for the additional $20 because what happens to the share price
after the purchase is irrelevant to his injury. Application of the traditional loss causation theory would also
result in the same $10 loss from the misstatement, but the reasoning would be very different: A suffers a loss
because of the $30 price drop, but only $10 is considered caused by the misstatement because the other $20 in
decline is not a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the misstatement.
In the second example, all the facts are the same except that in June, XYZ, instead of being a target of
a Bolivian confiscation, discovers oil in Indonesia. By July 1, the price has only gone down to $55 (i.e., the oil
discovery adds $5 to the price and the market realization of the truth about the food sales subtracts $10, for a net
loss of $5). Under the approach recommended here, A again has incurred a $10 loss because the misstatement
caused him to pay $10 more than he otherwise would have for shares. Application of the traditional loss
causation requirement, in contrast, would result in the recognition of $5 in loss because that is all that the price
has gone down.
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would have to suffer the full downside risk associated with unrelated bad news. They
would not be able, however, to enjoy fully the upside risks associated with unrelated
good news, because any such gains would cancel out, where present, their otherwise valid
cause of action for damages from a misstatement that inflated their purchase price. This
lack of balance in outcomes is not only arbitrary, it is inefficient. It distorts incentives for
investors who seek to profit through hard work by anticipating, ahead of the market, both
good and bad news events. Such activities are socially useful because they help improve
the accuracy of share prices. More accurate prices help allocate scarce capital to the most
promising investment projects and assist in the mechanisms that discipline management
and provide incentives.
2. Case Where it is not Clearly Established that the Misstatement Inflated Plaintiffs'
Purchase Price
Now consider the situation where the plaintiff has not clearly established one or
more of the essential elements causally linking the misstatement to a loss, i.e., that the
misstatement inflated the issuer's share price in the first place, that some or all of the
inflation still remained when the plaintiff made her purchase, and that the inflation still
present at the time of purchase had dissipated in part or in whole by the time of sale. In
such a situation the fact that price at the time suit is brought (or, if earlier, the time of
sale) is higher than the purchase price has some probative value. At a minimum it is
negative evidence that should be weighed against whatever affirmative evidence the
plaintiff introduces with regard to these elements. Moreover, as discussed in Part IV,
there is a rationale for bright line rules triggered by this fact that would bar damages
under some circumstances. In deciding how compelling the rationale is for adopting any
such bright line rule, however, the lower courts should bear in mind that the arbitrariness
and inefficiencies that would result from a blanket rule that never allows recovery when
the price at time of suit (or earlier sale) is greater than the purchase price would still, to
some extent, be present as well with more narrowly tailored bright line rules applicable in
only certain situations. Such rules are bound to cut out some cases where in fact the
misstatement did inflate the price.
B. Sufficient Pleadings and Proofs at Trial That the Misstatement Caused a Loss
A threshold question is whether it is necessary for the plaintiff to plead and prove a
As noted in the text, requiring the same loss causation showing in fraud-on-the-market cases as in traditional
reliance based cases results in a lack of balance in outcomes depending on whether, after the purchase, other
news affecting the fortunes of the issuer is positive or negative. Investors must suffer the full downside risk
associated with bad news. If Bolivia confiscates XYZ's mineral properties, as in the first example above, A
suffers the full $20 loss associated with the confiscation, since his right of recovery is still limited to $10, the
amount by which market realization of the truth concerning the food division sales depressed the price. Under
this approach, investors cannot, however, fully enjoy the upside risks associated with good news, because any
such gains will be eroded by market realization of the truth. If XYZ instead discovers oil in Indonesia, as in the
second example above, A's damages would be $5 since that is all that the price declined. A receives none of the
$5 that the good news is worth. He would be able to sell the security for $55 and receive $5 in damages for a
total of $60, exactly what he paid. In contrast, under the approach recommended here, A would enjoy the full $5
value of the good news. He could sell the security for $55 and receive $10 in damages, for a total of $65, $5
more than he paid.
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price drop immediately following the public announcement of the truth. The discussion in
Part IV suggests that such a requirement, while it has a rationale, would be too strict and
that the plaintiff should be able to introduce at least some other kinds of evidence
showing that the purchase price had been inflated by the misstatement and that the market
had later realized the true situation, thereby dissipating this inflation. To start, an
immediate significant increase in share price following a misstatement is as good
evidence that the misstatement inflated price as a significant price drop following a
public announcement of the falsity of the misstatement. Even if there is no price drop
following the public announcement, a plaintiff who purchased right after such a
misstatement was made and was still holding after the unambiguous public
announcement of the falsity of the misstatement is very likely to have suffered a loss. The
share price increase after the misstatement was made is a very strong indication that it
inflated the plaintiff's purchase price. The public announcement of the truth while she is
still holding the shares assures that the inflation has fully dissipated and that she cannot
recoup her injury by a resale at the inflated price.
Limiting recovery to cases where there is either a price drop after the public
announcement or an increase at the time the misstatement is made has an attractive
simplicity. Nevertheless, there are good arguments for allowing a plaintiff to submit less
definitive kinds of evidence at least under some circumstances. Market realization of the
true situation by another route in advance of an unambiguous public announcement of the
falsity of a misstatement is not uncommon and many price inflating misstatements would
not be actionable if less definitive evidence were prohibited. "1 2 Moreover, a blanket rule
against submission of such less definitive kinds of evidence would encourage an issuer
that made a misstatement to let the truth out slowly over time in bits and pieces so that no
single announcement has a market adjusted price drop associated with it sufficiently large
to be statistically significant. I have discussed in Part IV plausibly available kinds of
evidence that could be quite persuasive as to importance of the misstatement, its
acceptance as true by the market, and how the market realized the true situation prior to
the public announcement. I also suggested that in the typical class action, at least a
portion of the shares were purchased at time of misstatement or close enough to it that no
dissipation of any inflation is likely to have occurred. As far as damages owed to the
class as a whole is concerned, these shares are like the shares of persons in the second
situation as originally portrayed in Part IV, who purchased right after the misstatement
and still held the shares at the time suit was brought (which is after the inflation, if any,
was fully dissipated). Thus, if the lawyers for the class can make a persuasive argument
that there was an initial inflation of price, then clearly, in the aggregate, members of the
class suffered at least some losses as the result of the misstatement regardless of the time
112. As previously noted, the United States Solicitor General and the SEC urged the Supreme Court to
reverse the Ninth Circuit ruling in Dura. In their brief arguing for a grant of certiorari, they draw a distinction,
as ultimately does the Court and as is done here, between an investor who purchases a share whose price has
been inflated by a misstatement and sells while the price is still inflated and an investor who does not sell "until
the market price reflects the true facts that had been concealed by the fraud." In terms of how the market comes
to reflect these facts, interestingly the brief says: "This will most commonly occur when the truth is revealed in
whole or in part through a corrective disclosure. That, however, is not the only way fraud may be revealed.
Events may also effectively disclose the truth." Cert. Pet. Amicus Brief of the United States, supra note 74, at
11.
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and rate of dissipation of the inflation between the making of the misstatement and the
public announcement.
If less definitive kinds of evidence are allowed, the pleading standards need to be
carefully thought through. The Court stated that "ordinary pleading rules are not meant to
impose a great burden upon a plaintiff ... [b]ut it should not prove burdensome . . . to
provide a defendant with some indication of the loss and the causal connection that the
plaintiff has in mind." 113 Perhaps a bit more ominously for plaintiffs, it also said it would
"assume, at least for argument's sake, that neither the Rules [of Civil Procedure] nor the
securities statutes impose any special further requirement" beyond the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Rule 8(a)(2) requirement of "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." 114 Ultimately, though, whether this
standard is met depends on the contours of what needs to be proved at trial. The pleading
with respect to the self-evident importance of the misstatement under the assumption that
it is reliable should be satisfied if it is facially material. In essence, the Court already
accepted this idea when it blessed the fraud-on-the-market theory in Basic. Evidence
concerning the market acceptance of the misstatement as true should be available to
plaintiffs without discovery and so requiring specific allegations with respect to this
matter would not necessarily be very burdensome. Evidence supporting an explanation of
how the market realized the true situation prior to the unambiguous public announcement
may be more difficult to obtain. Moreover, as we have seen, for some plaintiffs--ones
who purchased right after the misstatement was made and were still holding their shares
when suit is brought-and for class action lawyers showing that at least some damages
are owed to the class, a persuasive showing of the importance of the misstatement and its
acceptance as true by the market can substitute for a complete explanation of how the
market realized the true situation. Thus, at least in these kinds of cases, a requirement of
specific allegations with regard to this explanation seems unwarranted.
C. The Relevance of the PSLRA
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) added section 21 D(b)(4) to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). This provision is entitled "Loss
Causation" and provides that plaintiffs in private actions "shall have the burden of
proving that the act or omission of the defendant ...caused the loss for which the
plaintiff seeks to recover damages." 115 The government argued before the Court in Dura
that this provision codifies the need for plaintiffs in fraud-on-the-market cases to
establish traditional loss causation with the requirement of a discrete drop in price after
an unambiguous announcement of the falsity of the misstatement and a limit on recovery
equal to the difference between the purchase price and the sale price. 116 The weakness of
this argument is that it begs the question of what is the loss with respect to which
causation must be shown. The approach advocated in this Article is that for fraud-on-the-
market cases, the loss with respect to which the plaintiff must show causation is the
inflation in the price the plaintiff paid minus the amount, if any, by which share price at
113. Dura, 125 S. Ct. at 1634 (citation omitted).
114. Id.
115. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-4(b)(4)(2005).
116. See, e.g., Cert. Pet. Amicus Brief for the United States, supra note 74, at 10-13.
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time of suit (or, if earlier, sale) is still inflated.
The language of section 21 D(b)(4) is fully consistent with the concept that the loss
the plaintiff must show was caused by the defendant's misstatement is that the
misstatement resulted in her paying too much for the security. 117 Indeed, in section
21 D(b)(4), the "loss" that is referred to is "the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover
damages" and, as noted earlier, the out-of-pocket measure of damages is the measure
conventionally applied by courts in Rule 1Ob-5 actions. Price inflation is the type of loss
that most closely corresponds with this measure of damages. Moreover, the PSLRA's
legislative history supports the conclusion that a showing of price inflation satisfies the
requirements of section 21 D(b)(4). The Conference Report, in explaining that the purpose
of section 21 D(b)(4) is to require the plaintiff to plead and prove that the misstatement
"actually caused the loss incurred by plaintiff' goes on to say "[f]or example, the plaintiff
would have to prove that the price at which the plaintiff bought the stock was artificially
inflated as a result of the misstatement." 118 In terms of the range of meanings of the term
"loss causation" that may have been comtemplated by Congress, it is also significant that
there existed appellate decisions prior to the passage of the PSLRA holding that a
showing of price inflation is sufficient to demonstrate loss causation. 
119
117. The government seeks to deny that this is a reasonable reading of the provision by stating "[a] loss is a
decline in value, and in a fraud-on-the-market case, that necessarily occurs at a point in time after the
purchase." Amicus Brief for the United States, supra note 74, at 7-8 (emphasis in the original). This narrow
interpretation of the word "loss" seems contradicted by the government elsewhere in this same brief and in its
own earlier brief in support of the defendant's certiorari petition. In these briefs, the government makes
statements such as "the inflation attributable to the untruth... could also be removed through an increase in the
price that is smaller than it otherwise would have been." Id. at 7. "A decline in price may not be a necessary
condition for loss causation, however, because the inflation attributable to fraud could be reduced or eliminated
even if there were a net increase in price." Cert. Pet. Amicus Brief of the United States, supra note 74, at 13. An
additional problem with this narrow reading of "loss" arises in the case of a fraud-on-the-market suit by a
plaintiff who sold shares of an issuer for less than he otherwise would have received because of a negative
misstatement on the part of the defendant and never repurchases the shares. See supra note 8. According to the
logic of the narrow definition, even though the plaintiff never repurchases, he does not suffer a "loss" until after
market realization of the truth. Such a conclusion defies common sense.
118. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41 (1995). In terms of Congressional intent concerning the meaning of the
word "loss" in § 21 D(b)(4), the government argues that notwithstanding this example, Congress must have
intended to require a showing of a loss after purchase because the PSLRA also added to section 12 of the
Securities Act of 1933 (the "Securities Act"), a provision which it also referred to as relating to "loss
causation." The addition to section 12 enables a defendant to reduce liability to the extent that he can show that
the amount otherwise recoverable represents "other than the depreciation in value of the ... security" resulting
from the misstatement. The government states, "there is no reason to believe that Congress had two different
standards of loss causation in mind when it enacted the PSLRA." Amicus Brief of the United States, supra note
74, at 8. The problem with the government's argument is that the prima facie measure of damages in a section
12 claim is recissionary: the difference between the price paid and the price at the time of suit. Thus any loss
causation limitation on section 12 damages would inevitably have to be phrased in terms of a reduction in
damages so measured. In contrast, the ordinary measure of damages in a Rule I Ob-5 action is the out of pocket
measure and hence there is no need to phrase a limitation on these damages in terms of a depreciation in the
value of the security.
119. See, e.g., In re Control Data Corp. Sec. Litig., 933 F.2d 616, 619-20 (8th Cir. 1991) ("To the extent
that the defendant's misrepresentations artificially altered the price of the stock and defrauded the market,
causation is presumed.").
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D. Should Fraud-on-the-Market Suits Be Discouraged by a Restrictive Rule of Causation
Some academic commentators have indicated a preference for fairly restrictive rules
relating to causation. My colleague, Professor John Coffee, for example, based on his
doubts about the overall desirability of fraud-on-the-market suits in the first instance,
argues, akin to loss causation in traditional reliance based cases, that a discrete drop in
price after an unambiguous announcement of the falsity of the misstatement should be
required and that recovery should be limited to the difference between the purchase price
and the sale price. 120 He argues that these more restrictive rules would limit the number
of fraud-on-the-market actions. Limiting the number of actions is desirable because it
means limiting amount of associated transaction costs. 12 1 These costs are primarily the
fees that both sides pay to the legal profession, costs that are ultimately bome largely by
shareholders. Coffee points out, correctly, that in the secondary market trading cases,
where fraud-on-the-market causes of action arise, the losses by the plaintiff purchaser,
who pays too much, are counterbalanced by the gains of the seller, who receives too
much. 122 The seller is usually also an outside investor, unrelated to the suit, who is
equally in the dark. From a societal point of view, therefore, because issuers pay most of
the damages and thus they ultimately come from the pockets of issuer shareholders,
fraud-on-the-market suits primarily redistribute wealth among innocent investors.
Accordingly, Professor Coffee feels that the compensatory justification for such suits is
weak, 123 a conclusion with which I tend to agree.
Fraud-on-the-market actions can have an efficiency justification as well, however,
and this justification may be much stronger than the compensatory justification. As
Professor Coffee acknowledges, such actions deter corporate misstatements,
124
something Bob Clark noted in his treatise even in the adanced of the explosion of
corporate misstatement cases following Basic.125  A lower level of corporate
misstatements increases share price accuracy. Greater share price accuracy makes the
economy more efficient through improvements in how new projects in the real economy
are selected for implementation and, by increasing the effectiveness of a number of
devices that limit the extent to which managers of public corporations place their own
interests above those of their shareholders, through improvements in how existing
projects are run. 12 6 An expectation of a lower level of corporate misstatements also
120. John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should Reject Phantom
Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 Bus. LAW. 533, 537 (2005).
121. Id. at 542.
122. Id. at 534.
123. Id. at 542-43.
124. Id. at 543.
125. CLARK, supra note 5, at 345.
126. See Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is not Investor
Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REv. 1335, 1358-69 (1999). Professor Robert Thompson, in an article also relating to
Dura published in this issue, expresses some reservations concerning the use of securities fraud suits to perform
these functions, saying "state law of fiduciary duty and the deference inherent in the business judgment rule
provide both a check on possible management abuse of their authority and considerable room for management
to make decisions free of second-guessing by courts." Robert B. Thompson, Federal Corporate Law: Torts and
Fiduciary Duty (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Journal of Corporation Law). Because of the
way fraud-on-the-market suits deter managerial abuse, however, it is not clear that they really deprive
management of the room they need to make decisions or give courts an ability to second guess management's
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lowers investor precaution costs, the resources secondary market traders and their
advisors expend trying to detect misstatements so as to avoid losing transactions.
The question of the role of private civil damages litigation in deterring issuer
misstatements in situations where neither the issuer nor its insiders engage in significant
trading is a complicated one. It involves a variety of rules beyond causation requirements,
including, among others, rules determining how difficult it is to sue various potential
defendants (issuers, directors and officers, control shareholders, accountants, etc.), the
amounts that such defendants would be expected to pay out in damages, and the fees to
plaintiffs' class action lawyers. Mandatory periodic disclosure rules and rules concerning
related issuer, officer and gatekeeper liability rules are relevant as well. In addition to
deterring misstatements, the design of this whole complex of rules needs to be concerned
with the incentives of issuers to make truthful statements in situations where there is no
duty to disclose and with the incentives of different kinds of investors to gather, analyze
and act on information. 127 It is desirable to have a set of rules that, working together,
encourage suits where the efficiency benefits exceed the costs and that discourage suits
where the opposite is the case.
Personally, I believe that the prevailing set of rules is not perfect. It encourages
some kinds of suits where the costs exceed the deterrence value and discourage some
other kinds of suits where their deterrence value would exceed their costs. Imposition of a
traditional loss causation rule in fraud-on-the-market suits does not appear to be a rational
way of remedying this problem, however. It will arbitrarily cut out plaintiffs in cases
where positive news unrelated to the misstatement has counterbalanced the effect on
price from the market realization of the misstatement. There is no reason to think that the
deterrence value of these cases is any less, or their costs any greater, than those of cases
where traditional loss causation can be demonstrated. It will also cut out all cases where
there is no drop in price after the unambiguous announcement of the falsity of the
misstatement. This seems arbitrary with respect to cases where there is other clear
evidence of price inflation. Again, compared to cases where traditional loss causation can
be demonstrated, the deterrence value should be no less and, as explored here, the costs
should not be dramatically greater.
E. The Assumption of Constant Impact
I assume throughout this Article that the facts asserted by the misstatement would, if
they had been true, have had a constant impact on the underlying fundamental value of an
issuer's shares. For many kinds of misrepresentations, this assumption is a reasonably
close approximation of reality. To illustrate, consider issuer A, with 5 million shares
outstanding, that falsely stated that it had an extra $60 million in cash in its treasury. If
substantive decisions. Fraud-on-the-market suits deter managerial behavior only indirectly, by encouraging
honesty in disclosure. Abuse that cannot be hidden is abuse that will probably not be undertaken. It is not a
court's view of what constitutes abuse that managers fear, however, it is the market's and the public's views.
While it is true, as Thompson points out, that a management that chooses to abuse is likely to make an
actionable misstatement to hide it, the court simply has to judge whether a material misstatement has been
made, not whether the underlying behavior constitutes abuse or not.
127. See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation (Columbia
Law and Economics Working Paper No. 259, 2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=600709 (discussing
civil liability rules with regard to incentives on investors).
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the issuer had really had this $60 million in cash in the treasury at the time of the original
misstatement, the fundamental value of each share would have been increased by $12.
The same would be true if the issuer had really had this $60 million in the treasury at the
time of the announcement of the truth.
For other kinds of misstatements, this assumption of constant impact is not a
reasonable approximation of reality. To illustrate this second kind of misstatement,
consider issuer B, also with 5 million shares outstanding, that falsely stated that it had an
extra one million barrels of oil in storage. If the issuer had really had this one million
barrels of oil at the time the misrepresentation was made and the price of oil was $60, the
fundamental value of each share would again have been increased by $12. Suppose,
though, that between the time of the misstatement and the time when the truth was
announced, the price of oil decreased to $50 per barrel. By the time of the announcement
of the truth, then, if the issuer had really had this one million barrels of oil in storage, the
fundamental value of each share would have been increased by only $10. Thus, the
impact of the facts asserted by the misstatement on the underlying fundamental value of
an issuer's shares, which remained constant in the first example, dropped by $2 in the
second example.
I employ the constant impact assumption because, despite its deviation from reality
with regard to this second type of misstatement, it simplifies the discussion of the most
important issues related to loss causation without serious loss of generality. For some
kinds of cases, the lack of reality in the assumption has no impact at all on the analysis.
Consider again the misstatements by issuer A and issuer B in the context of cases
resembling the first or second situations discussed in Part III, where an investor buys
immediately after the misstatement and holds the shares until after the public
announcement of the truth. An investor who buys a share of A pays $12 more per share
than he would have but for A's misstatement, and the same is true of an investor who
buys a share of B. 128 As a consequence, the misstatement caused each of the investors a
$12 loss. This is because each paid $12 too much and each did not recoup any of this loss
by selling at a price that was to any extent still inflated by the misstatement.
Where an investor purchases later than immediately after the misstatement and/or
sells before the market fully realizes the true situation, the assumption of constant impact
may be more problematic, but it still has a rationale. This is because the EMH guarantees
that the impact of the facts asserted by the misstatement on the underlying fundamental
value of an issuer's shares at the time of the misstatement is an unbiased estimate of this
impact at any point in the future as well. In other words, the value that the market would
assign to each share of B at the time of the misstatement reflects both the chance that the
price of oil in the future might go up and the chance that it might go down. As a
consequence, it would not be unreasonable to have a rule that there is no loss in the case
of an investor in our example who purchased a share of B immediately after the oil
misstatement, when, if fully believed, it inflated the price by $12, and who sold shortly
before the announcement of the truth, when, if the misstatement was still fully believed, it
inflated the price by only $10. The value the market assigned to this nonexistent oil at the
time of the investor's purchase reflected the possibilities both that the price of oil might
128. In each, for purposes of expositional convenience, I am assuming that the market fully believes the
misstatement at the time it is made. This assumption is not necessary for the point to hold.
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go up, which at time of sale would have resulted in a share price inflation of more than
$12, as well as might go down. Thus, it can be argued, while the misstatement is a but for
cause of the $2 shortfall, it is not a proximate cause. This is because at the time the
investor purchased the share, the misstatement, if the investor were to sell before market
realization of the truth, was as likely to have resulted in a gain from an increase in the
amount the misstatement inflates price as to have resulted in a loss from a decrease in the
amount the misstatement inflates price. Under this argument, it is the decrease in the
price of oil, not the issuer's misstatement, that is the legal cause of the $2 shortfall. Dura
does not decide whether an economic disadvantage at time of sale arising out of a fall in
the underlying value of a falsely claimed asset, such as this $2 shortfall, should be
considered a loss caused by the misstatement. Cases may arise, of course, that require
resolution of this question, but beyond my observation that a reasonable argument could
be made that such a shortfall should not be considered a loss, I do not pursue the issue
further here. The constant impact assumption helps us keep our focus on what I believe
are the two most important questions for loss causation-did the misstatement inflate
price in the first place and has the inflation dissipated by time of sale-questions that are
involved in every fraud-on-the-market case.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has evaluated the issues remaining open after the Court's decision in
Dura. Analytically, in an action for damages based on the fraud-on-the-market theory, for
a positive misstatement to cause an investor to suffer a loss, (1) the misstatement must
inflate the market price of a security, (2) the investor must purchase the security at the
inflated price, and (3) the investor must not resell the security sufficiently quickly that the
price at the time of sale is still equally inflated. Dura's narrow holding is that a plaintiff
cannot establish causation merely by pleading and proving that the misstatement inflated
price. Future courts have thus been left the task of designing a comprehensive set of rules
concerning what the plaintiff must plead and prove, and the acceptable forms of
evidence, concerning each of these three critical elements. I have tried to suggest a
number of considerations that can help them do that in a way that minimizes the conflict
between the two important social aims of deterring corporate misstatements and limiting
the transaction costs associated with civil litigation.
One important matter on which the Court expresses no opinion is whether loss
causation can ever be established where the price at the time suit is brought (or, if earlier,
at the time of sale) is higher than the purchase price. This Article concludes that a blanket
rule against actions where the price has increased would be inappropriate because there
are situations where the price has increased but each of the three critical elements can still
be reasonably easily and definitively established. Where one or more of these elements
cannot be reasonably easily and definitively established, however, a price increase is a
negative piece of evidence concerning whether the misstatement inflated price and a
bright line rule barring actions when price has increased might be appropriate at least
under some specified circumstances.
The other important matter on which the Court expresses no opinion is whether the
plaintiff must plead and prove a price drop immediately following the unambiguous
public announcement of the falsity of the misstatement. Again, this Article concludes that
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a blanket rule requiring such a showing is inappropriate. Other ways of demonstrating
that the misstatement inflated price are sufficiently reliable that they should be allowed
under at least some circumstances. The absence of a price drop after the announcement,
however, makes it less clear when the inflation dissipated, which is relevant to whether
the plaintiff both bought at a time when the price was still inflated (if it ever was inflated)
and sold at a time when it was no longer inflated. Some plaintiffs can show these other
two elements reasonably easily and definitively, for example plaintiffs who purchase the
security immediately after the misstatement is made and still hold it at the time of the
public announcement of its falsity. For plaintiffs whose purchase and sale timings do not
fit this profile, it may be appropriate to bar actions where there is no post announcement
price drop. This problem is less critical for class actions because at least minimum losses
to the class as a whole can be established without concern as to when the inflation
dissipated.
